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Abstract 
Scholars and laymen alike have in the past lamented the ambiguous and confusing nature of 
post-apartheid South African foreign policy, specifically with relation to humanitarian crises 
on the African continent. Regularly the principles of promoting human rights and democracy 
on the continent seemingly fall to the wayside in favour of a stubborn adherence to respecting 
state sovereignty and African solidarity. No two cases exemplify this more than President 
Thabo Mbeki’s continued reliance on the policy of Quiet Diplomacy in addressing the political 
and economic crises in Zimbabwe and the alleged genocide in Darfur, Sudan, both of which 
occurred in the early years of the 21st century. Some International Relations scholars have 
previously suggested the influence of Mbeki’s anti-Western-imperialist convictions as a 
constructivist explanation to this foreign policy ambiguity, but all of them attempt to address 
the ambiguity only within the specific contexts of Sudan and Zimbabwe, none attempting to 
create an overarching exploration of both cases. This thesis attempts to use constructivist 
methodologies to a) rationally establish, through a logical and structured approach, anti-
Western-imperialist considerations as a common variable that was able to influence the foreign 
policy decision in both Zimbabwe and Sudan, and b) explain how anti-Western-Imperialism 
was able to exert such an influence. Firstly, a Rule Based Language Orientated Constructivist 
(RBLOC) approach is employed to create two language games, one for each case (Sudan and 
Zimbabwe), utilising primary and secondary sources to recreate verbal and non-verbal speech 
acts for the actors involved. Through the dialogical analysis of these language games, the 
common variable of ‘anti-Western-imperialist considerations’ is identified as essential for the 
rational conclusion of each language game. Secondly, Securitisation Theory, extrapolated to 
a regional, interstate level, is used to explain how anti-Western-imperialist convictions on the 
part of President Mbeki were able to influence the policy responses in the respective case 
studies. Ultimately it is the aim of this thesis to prove that in both cases the presence of 
President Mbeki’s psycho-cultural disposition, a shared referent object (anti-Western 
Imperialism), and the securitisation of Western Imperialism can be confirmed and that the 
presence of these variables can be used to rationally explain Mbeki’s use of Quiet Diplomacy 
in those instances.  
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Opsomming 
Die skynbaar dubbelsinnige en verwarrende aard van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid, veral 
ten opsigte van humanitêre krisisse op die Afrika-vasteland, is deurgaans deur kundiges en 
leke betreur. Beginsels soos die bevordering van menseregte en demokrasie op die vasteland 
is op gereelde grondslag verbeur ten gunste van ’n weerbarstige aanhang van 
staatsoewereniteit en Afrika-solidariteit. Twee gevalle wat hierdie verskynsel uitstekend 
illustreer is Pres. Thabo Mbeki se beleid van stille diplomasie ten opsigte van die politieke en 
ekonomiese krisisse in Zimbabwe en die beweerde volksmoorde in Soedan se Darfur-streek, 
albei gebeure van die vroeë 21ste Eeu. Menige Konstruktiwiste het gepoog om die 
dubbelsinnighede van hierdie twee gevalle aan die hand van Mbeki se toentertydse anti-
Westerse-imperialistiese oortuigings te verklaar, maar niemand het nog gepoog om ’n 
omvattende ontleding van albei gevalle te doen nie. In hierdie tesis word gepoog om twee 
duidelik onderskeibare Konstruktiwistiese metodologieë in te span om a) deur ’n  logiese en 
gestruktureerde benadering te bevestig dat die anti-Westerse-imperialistiese oorwegings ’n 
gemene veranderlike was wat ’n invloed kon hê op die uitkomste in Zimbabwe sowel as in die 
Soedan, en b) om te verklaar hoe hierdie anti-Westerse-imperialistiese oorwegings so ’n 
invloed kon uitoefen. Eerstens, word ’n Reël-Gebaseerde, Taal Georiënteerde 
Konstruktiwistiese benadering aangewend om twee spraakspeletjies, een vir elk van die 
gevallestudies, te skep. Primêre en sekondêre bronne word gebruik om die spraakhandeling 
van die betrokke rolspelers in albei gevalle te herkonstrueer. Deur die dialogiese aard van 
hierdie spraakspeletjies te ontleed, word die gemene veranderlike van die anti-Westerse-
imperialistiese oorwegings uitgewys as onontbeerlik vir die rasionele volvoering van elke 
spraakspel. Tweedens, beveiligingsteorie,ge-ekstrapoleer tot interstaatsvlak in 
streeksverband, word toegepas om te verklaar  hoe Mbeki se anti-Westerse-imperialistiese 
oortuigings ’n invloed gehad het op beleidmaking. Die tesis voer aan dat Pres. Mbeki se keuse 
tot stille diplomasie in albei gevalle rasioneel verklaar kan word aan die hand van Mbeki se 
psigo-kulterele ingesteldheid, ’n gemene verwysingsvoorwerp (anti-Westerse-imperialisme), 
en die sekuritisasie van Westerse-imperialisme deur die betrokke rolspelers.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1) The Ambiguity of South African Foreign Policy - Background to the 
Problem 
“General objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions 
with other states” reads the noticeably brief and simple definition of foreign policy as provided 
by the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2013). A more comprehensive description would include: 
“… those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and / 
or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign 
communities, are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors, both governmental and 
non-governmental, which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy” 
(Carlsnaes, 2002:335). As Carlsnaes mentions, the foreign policy of a state can usually be 
surmised through explicit statements of adherence to certain foreign policy principles, either 
through official documents or speech acts. However, in certain situations these objectives or 
goals, which may seem harmonious in theory, become conflicting in practice. In such situations 
the international relations of a state can become seemingly irrational and inexplicable.  
Irrationality and inexplicability has likewise been attributed to South Africa’s post-apartheid 
foreign policy which political analysts previously described as ambivalent (Cilliers, 1999) and 
prone to ‘ad hoc-ery’ (Evans, 1999: 624). More than ten years later experts still agree that, to 
the lay person, contemporary South African foreign policy remains ambiguous (Serrão & 
Bischoff, 2009:363), unpredictable (South Africa’s foreign policy: All over the place, 2011), 
baffling (Nathan, 2011:26), “… devoid of any specific direction or principle” (Neethling, 2012: 
34), or “… might be best described as [a policy] of disparity between commitment and action” 
(Borer & Mills, 2011:77). What each of these scholars is lamenting is confusion resultant from 
an ambiguous foreign policy in practice that reflects conflicting theoretical principles. 
The confusion and ambiguity surrounding South Africa’s (SA) foreign policy, however, has 
not been a case of the government, the ruling African National Congress (ANC), being unclear 
in its explicit statement of foreign policy. For instance, when comparing South African foreign 
policy, as outlined in the Department of Foreign Affairs’ (DFA) Strategic Plan for 2005-2008, 
with that of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s (DIRCO - to which 
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the DFA was renamed in 2009) Strategic Plan for 2012-2017, one can easily establish a handful 
of foreign policy fundamentals that have, bar a few superficial changes in wording and 
emphasis, remained constant over the years. These fundamentals include a commitment to 
respecting the right of Africans to self-determination and self-governance (which can also be 
reworded as “respecting state sovereignty”), settling African disputes peacefully through 
negotiation, upholding human rights on the African continent, and lastly promoting an ‘African 
Renaissance’ (DFA Strategic Plan 2005-2008; DIRCO Strategic Plan 2012-2017). The 
‘African Renaissance’ is of particular importance to South African foreign policy, as it is 
considered to be very influential in the conceptions of the other fundamental principles (Vale 
& Maseko, 1998; Taylor & Williams, 2001; Evans, 1999; Cilliers, 1999).   
The idea of an African Renaissance was only formally introduced in a 1997 address by (then 
soon to be South African President) Thabo Mbeki, but the sentiment had already resonated 
equally strong in Mbeki’s earlier “I am an African” speech of 1996. Relevant to this analysis 
is the particular emphasis that Mbeki placed on the principles of African solidarity, the 
protection and promotion of democracy and human rights, and anti-Western-Imperialism 
(Mbeki, 1998). Besides promulgating the ideas of African solidarity and the promotion of 
democracy and human rights, all of which resonate throughout contemporary South African 
foreign policy, it also emphasises anti-Western-Imperialism, the importance of which will be 
revealed shortly. For now it is important to note the presence of the other foreign policy 
directives in Mbeki’s African Renaissance and their correlation with the fundamental principles 
of South African foreign policy, as explicitly stated in DIRCO’s strategic plans. Bar anti-
Western-Imperialism, and a few other minor principles evident in both strategic plans and the 
African Renaissance, for the purposes of this study there are four relevant foreign policy 
principles: 1) Promoting and respecting state sovereignty; 2) Promoting the principle of African 
solidarity; 3) Promoting, upholding, and respecting human rights; and 4) Promoting democracy. 
Having identified four principles that are stated with clarity throughout official foreign policy 
documents from 1994 onwards, it is evident that the confusion regarding SA foreign policy 
does not stem from ambiguity in stated policy, but perhaps rather from an inherent conflict 
between these principles? 
Examples of situations where the four principles (sovereignty, African solidarity, human rights, 
and democracy) have clearly conflicted include the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe post-2002 
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that was caused by an almost complete economic collapse and numerous political 
transgressions by the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF), as well as the humanitarian crisis, that peaked in 2003, in the Darfur region, 
locking Sudanese government forces and Arab rebels in a bloody civil war. In both these cases 
the South African government implemented meagre measures, if any, to address the 
humanitarian crises, which is contrary to the principles of promoting democracy and human 
rights and thus attracted “… a great deal of criticism from human rights groups and Western 
governments” (Nathan, 2011:56). Rather than intervene decisively, SA and Mbeki would, in 
accordance with the principles of respecting state sovereignty and African solidarity, resort to 
Quiet Diplomacy (refraining from public admonishment or interference in another sovereign 
state) in dealing with the governments of Zimbabwe and Sudan. In the 2009 Annual Report of 
Human Rights Watch, the adherence to Quiet Diplomacy led to the assessment that the SA 
government had “… consistently sided with and protected some of the world’s worst 
perpetrators of human rights abuses” (Lipton, 2009:331). This dichotomy between on the one 
hand being the champion of constitutionalised human rights and a peaceful democratic 
transition, and on the other hand staunchly advocating state sovereignty and unwavering 
solidarity with other African governments, all of which are explicitly expressed in official 
foreign policy documents, is what ultimately leads to the ambiguity in South Africa’s foreign 
policy.  
For the purpose of brevity the two sets of conflicting principles will be grouped throughout the 
thesis: The promotion of human rights and democracy shall be henceforth referred to as Human 
Rights and the respect for state sovereignty and African solidarity will be called State Rights. 
In the past, some scholars have, in an effort to explain the dichotomy between foreign policy 
in theory and in practice, investigated South African foreign policy and proposed various 
theories based on Middlepowermanship (Jordaan, 2012; Taylor, 2001; Cilliers, 1999) 
(associated with a middle power state that seeks to stabilise and legitimise the global order 
through multilateral and cooperative initiatives), an increased emphasis on national interest 
(Spies, 2011), and even the influence of class interests (Mckinly, 2004). However, a large 
number of scholars researching and writing about South African foreign policy, specifically 
where it applies to Africa, agree on two aspects: A constructivist framework is best able to 
explain this dichotomy and that the African Renaissance, and the principles derived from it, 
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are integral to such an explanation. These scholars and their views are briefly investigated 
forthwith.  
Scholars who either write about South African foreign policy in general, such as Nathan (2011), 
Vale & Maseko (1998), Schraeder (2001), and Solomon (2003), or specifically investigate 
South African relations with other African states, namely Neethling (2012), Lipton (2009), and 
Taylor and Williams (2001), agree that a constructivist framework, prioritising ideals and 
values, is best suited to contextualise contemporary, post-apartheid, South African foreign 
policy. Even authors who do not advocate using a completely constructivist framework in 
analysing contemporary SA foreign policy, for example Serrão and Bischoff (2009), agree that 
“… constructivist International Relations (IR) theory offers several key insights into studies of 
South Africa’s foreign policy” (Serrão & Bischoff 2009:263). Within these constructivist 
analyses most authors make reference to the African Renaissance as the core influence that 
shapes South African foreign policy on the African continent, either by referring to it explicitly 
or implicitly by mention of all, or many, of the key principles of DIRCO’s strategic plans as 
derived from the African Renaissance. When reading these texts it becomes clear that they 
corroborate the hypothesis that the confusion about South African foreign policy, and 
interactions with other African states, can be ascribed to a clash between the principles of state 
sovereignty and African solidarity (State Rights) and human rights and democracy (Human 
Rights): A conflict of paradigms (Nathan, 2005), ideals and values (Lipton, 2009:342), or 
competing ideologies (Borer & Mills, 2011:86). Specifically, this conflict most often arises in 
situations where South Africa is tasked with responding to a humanitarian crisis in a (de facto) 
undemocratic African state which is unwilling to acknowledge, or resolve, the crisis itself.  
As with the examples of Sudan and Zimbabwe, it is usually the case that the international 
community expects South Africa as a country with a) the political influence, b) material means, 
as well as c) the assumed resolve, garnered from its own relatively recent struggle against gross 
human rights violations and undemocratic tyranny, to intervene on behalf of those whose 
human rights are being violated, in adherence to its self-professed foreign policy principle of 
promoting and protecting Human Rights. However, instead of concerted efforts to intervene on 
behalf of those in need, the South African government has in the past, much to the 
disappointment of most of the international community, usually either engaged in very subdued 
and / or marginal efforts to resolve the crisis, or have in some cases even responded with open 
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support for the regimes who commit or facilitate the human rights violations. In these cases it 
becomes clear that State Rights trump Human Rights. This poses several questions: Why is this 
the case? And will this always be the case in all circumstances? These are the questions that 
this thesis proposes to address.  
1.2) Mbeki and Anti-Western-Imperialism – Problem Statement of the 
Study 
Normally, ambiguity in a state’s foreign policy is not necessarily problematic as 
“[p]olicymakers and scholars alike have long noted the existence of a significant gap between 
theory and practice in foreign policy” (George, 1993: ix). However, it does become concerning 
when one acknowledges that post-apartheid South Africa has become “… without doubt a 
hegemon in the SADC [Southern African Development Community] region and in Africa” 
(Ferim, 2008:181). If the role of a hegemon is considered to involve “… establish[ing] the 
‘rules’ of international relations and uphold[ing] the status quo structure governing relations 
between states” (Szayna, Byman, Bankes, Eaton, Jones, Mullins, Lesser,  & Rosenau, 2001:46) 
then South Africa’s uncertain foreign policy and seemingly arbitrary interactions with other 
states on the African continent does little to establish consistent ‘rules’ or “… structure[s] of 
international political and economic interactions” (Szayna et al, 2001:47) which other states in 
its hegemonic sphere of influence can follow or work within. Understanding why, and under 
which circumstances, State Rights trump Human Rights in SA’s reaction to humanitarian crises 
on the African continent will alleviate some of the ambiguity that political pundits have 
associated with SA’s foreign policy as well as expose a microcosm of rules and structures for 
political interactions present on the continent.  
Although constructivist theorists have reached a general consensus (Nathan, 2011; Vale & 
Maseko, 1998; Schraeder, 2001; Solomon, 2003;  Neethling, 2012; Lipton, 2009; Taylor & 
Williams, 2001) that the ambiguous nature of South African relations within Africa is due to 
the inherent conflict, in practice, between State Rights and Human Rights, none have attempted 
to construct a general theory describing when such a conflict will occur and under what 
circumstances one principle will prevail over another. For instance, very little attention has 
been paid to whether the presence of another variable, outside of Human and State Rights, 
could be tipping the favour towards State Rights. Furthermore, when authors approach a 
specific international relations scenario between South Africa and another African state with 
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the conflicting foreign policy principles as central thesis, such as Merle Lipton (2009) 
explaining South Africa’s use of Quiet Diplomacy during the Zimbabwean crisis from 2000 
onwards, they merely conclude that “[c]onflicting ideals and values seem highly salient in this 
conflict, in particular, the tension between principles of sovereignty, good governance, and the 
respect for human rights” (Lipton, 2009:342) without reference to a hierarchy of principles. 
Such a hierarchy could serve as a starting point for a framework or model regarding South 
African interventions in the case of human rights violations on the African continent.  But when 
such a hierarchy is formulated and proposed, as attempted by Festus Aboagye (2012), it is 
concluded that the principle of respecting sovereignty will always outweigh those of promoting 
human rights and democracy. Aboagye arrives at this conclusion by deducing that this has 
always been true in the past and therefore the validity would necessarily hold in the future. 
Although the first part of his observation is not untrue, an indiscriminate assumption that the 
principle of State Rights has, and therefore always will, automatically trump Human Rights is 
problematic in that it does not take into consideration the possibility that under some 
circumstances Human Rights might well prevail and what these possible circumstances might 
entail. There exists relevant historical evidence, discussed further in this study, which pose 
questions that serve to corroborate such an argument. For instance, why did the South Africa 
government reverse its decision to support a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya during the Arab Spring of 2011? And ten years before that, 
why did Thabo Mbeki and the South African government move from, as Phimister & 
Raftopoulos (2004:390) report, an impartial stance regarding the then unfolding economic and 
political crisis in Zimbabwe to an open endorsement of President Robert Mugabe and his 
policies by the end of 2002 whereas previously Mbeki had, on occasion, even spoken out 
against the situation in the neighbouring country (Graham, 2006:121)? These reversals are 
indicative of a variable (not one of the four core principles previously stated), common to both 
situations, that was the deciding factor on State Rights overriding Human Rights.  
Phimister and Raftopoulos hint at the possibility of such an influential variable in their analysis 
of the Zimbabwe crisis: “By defining the Zimbabwean crisis as one of anti-colonial redress and 
land redistribution, Mugabe has very skilfully set the parameters of the subsequent debate” 
(Phimster & Raftopoulos, 2004:386). This would imply that State Rights do not necessarily 
and mechanically take priority over Human Rights in SA’s foreign policy, but that there is a 
possible influence of a variable that, when present, gives it enough weight to do so. This is 
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where the earlier reference to anti-Western-Imperialism as core tenet of an African Renaissance 
becomes salient. Although never explicitly stated in official documents, if one supposes anti-
Western-Imperialism, apparent within Mbeki’s statements on the African Renaissance (as 
detailed in the previous section), to be a publicly undisclosed principle of South African foreign 
policy, then anti-Western-imperialist considerations becomes a plausible variable. The use of 
the term anti-Western-imperialist considerations is used to denote that, due to the anti-Western-
imperialist sentiments of Mbeki (made apparent in his statements on the African Renaissance 
and discussed in-depth in Chapter 4), the foreign policy actions of Mbeki in specific scenarios 
(in this case humanitarian crises on the African continent) are influenced by the introduction 
of a Western-imperialist rhetoric, or actions, by other actors in those settings. Although a few 
academics have previously proposed this trend in South African foreign policy, studies are 
limited to specific situations. Lipton (2004), Graham (2006), and Phimister and Raftopoulos 
(2004) noted the influence of anti-Western-imperialist values and rhetoric in dealing with the 
Zimbabwe crisis, Nathan (2011) in Sudan, and Neethling (2012) in Libya. These authors 
attempt to establish anti-Western-Imperialism as a principle of South African foreign policy, 
but no attempt is made to establish anti-Western-imperialist considerations as an independent 
variable, or to construct a theory regarding this variable and its influence on South African 
international relations. This includes foreign governments invoking Western-imperialist 
rhetoric or actions by Western governments that could be construed as imperialist.  
In this thesis, ‘anti-Western-imperialist considerations’ is used as a term to denote the 
hypothesised interplay between Western-imperialist rhetoric and / or actions by other African 
actors and Mbeki’s own anti-Western-imperialist sentiments in influencing whether State 
Rights take precedent over Human Rights. It appears that thus far no overarching analysis of 
the impact of anti-Western-imperialist considerations on South African foreign policy has been 
attempted, except for the work of Laurie Nathan which does share many similarities to what is 
being proposed in this thesis, but differs in that it does not focus (at least not as much as this 
study) on the use of structured, methodical approaches in establishing the presence of anti-
Western-imperialist considerations or in explaining why these consideration are influential. As 
it is the differences in theoretical frameworks and methodology that are the most apparent in a 
comparison between this work and Nathan’s, such a comparison will be provided at the end of 
the following section - Theoretical Frameworks and Methodology.      
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Analysing the influence of anti-Western-Imperialism on post-apartheid SA’s foreign policy, 
spread across 20 years and three presidents, is challenging, the difficulty of which increases if 
one were to analyse a sample of multiple cases studies from each of these presidents across the 
full spectrum of the last 20 years. Therefore, this study will focus on the foreign policy of one 
South African president only - President Thabo Mbeki. The reasons why President Mbeki was 
selected as the subject of this study are described below. Firstly, Mbeki presided over the 
country and its foreign policy for nearly half of the 20 years since democracy, leaving an 
indelible mark. Secondly, the highly centralised nature of foreign policy constructed by Mbeki 
in his presidency (discussed in Chapter 3) created a marked closeness between the President 
and the country’s foreign policy, a situation that proves important to key assumptions 
throughout the study. Thirdly, the influence of Mbeki’s African Renaissance on foreign policy 
during his presidency serves to bolster the constructivist methodology used within this thesis 
by providing a tangible link between the government’s foreign policy and the President’s 
convictions, the latter of which is extracted from numerous explicit statements regarding the 
African Renaissance. And lastly, during his tenure as President, Mbeki was involved in two of 
the biggest foreign policy debacles in SA post-apartheid history, responding to alleged 
genocide in Sudan and the near socio-economic and diplomatic collapse of Zimbabwe in the 
early 2000s with the use of Quiet Diplomacy.  
Comparing the analysis of the case studies in terms of the South African responses to the crises 
in Zimbabwe and Sudan will provide the knowledge needed to establish whether anti-Western-
imperialist considerations can be justified as a possible variable influencing the outcome in the 
conflict between State Rights and Human Rights.  As such the research problem for this study 
is to firstly establish, using a systematic approach that analyses historical cases, that anti-
Western-Imperialism was a foreign policy principle adhered to by the South African 
government under Mbeki and was able to influence SA inter-state interactions on the African 
continent, and secondly, through the use of theoretical modelling and logic, deduce the reasons 
for it being influential.  
Consequently the research question is formulated as follows:  
 “What influence did anti-Western-imperialist considerations have in dictating the result of the 
conflict between the principles of State Rights (the respect for state sovereignty and African 
Solidarity) and Human Rights (promoting human rights and democracy) in the South African 
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government’s response, under President Mbeki, to the humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe and 
Sudan, and how can such a possible influence be rationally explained?    
To adequately answer this question, a selection of methodological tools and frameworks will 
be employed in this study.  
1.3) Theoretical Frameworks & Methodology - Foreign Policy Decision 
Making, Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism, and 
Securitisation Theory   
The following section is divided into two parts, the first explaining the theoretical frameworks 
employed in this study and the second detailing the methodological approaches derived from 
the frameworks and how they are used to answer the research questions.  
1.3.1) Theoretical Frameworks 
The theoretical grounding for this study is difficult to pinpoint. This study is primarily 
concerned with foreign policy and uses the state as the unit of analysis, yet it is not comparative 
in nature and thus does not technically fall under the International Relations (IR) sub-field of 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) which usually covers studies on comparative foreign policy 
when the state is used as the unit of analysis (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2012:7). Neither is 
this study strictly concerned with how a state creates foreign policy, but it does share 
similarities with the ‘middle range” class of FPA theories which seek to provide accounts “… 
of either foreign policies of some types of states or foreign policy in specific situations (such 
as crises)” (Smith et al, 2012:4). Furthermore, the emphasis on how and why decisions are 
made regarding the implementation of explicitly stated foreign policy principles also lends the 
study a tangible connection to the realm of Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) theories. 
This statement can be justified by examining the observations made by Hollis & Smith in their 
article entitled Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making (1986). Hollis & Smith 
elucidate a less mechanical approach to the classical Bureaucratic Politics Model within FPDM 
that incorporates roles and reasons as integral to any decision-making, stating that “[r]ole-
players each have several roles … [and] … there is no denying that conflict between roles is as 
common as conflict within then. When it occurs, the actor has to decide which role shall prevail. 
This decision cannot, in the nature of the case, be mechanical” (Hollis & Smith, 1986:276). 
Although Hollis & Smith are making reference to bureaucratic actors within a state, and how 
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they do not necessarily blindly conform to their prescribed roles when deciding on foreign 
policy, one can also extrapolate this analogy to the state level. 
Casting the post-apartheid South African government as the main role player in practicing 
South African foreign policy on the African continent - an actor torn between the prescribed 
roles of a paragon of human rights and democracy and fervent supporter of African solidarity 
and state sovereignty -  the parables can be drawn between it and Hollis & Smith’s conflicted 
‘human’ actor. Such a state actor, like its human counterpart, has multiple roles and must 
eventually be able to legitimise his actions by reference to a prescribed role (Hollis & Smith, 
1986:227), or roles in case of the South African government. The reasoning, or justification, 
behind choosing one role over the other does not have to be made clear, or even public, rather 
“… the true motive for his actions need not be those he professes” (Hollis & Smith, 1986: 277). 
Like the bureaucratic actor, the South African government might have to legitimise its actions 
by referencing an explicit, prescribed role, such as advocate of state sovereignty and African 
solidarity, yet the decisions could stem from another, unprofessed, motive or influence. As was 
mentioned previously, discovering this unprofessed motive / influence for South Africa’s 
actions is the goal of this study. While FPDM will serve as general underlying framework 
grounding the purpose of the study, the combination of two other theories will be used to 
answer the primary research question. 
Continuing the trend of previous authors on the subject, this study will be utilising a 
constructivist framework, emphasising the importance of values and ideas and gathered from 
historical frameworks to create a working theory on South African foreign relations. More 
specifically, the study will be using a slightly modified version of the language-based 
constructivist theory by Peter Howard when he rationalised the United States’ (US) foreign 
policy with regards to Iraq and North Korea, as well as the works of other notable language-
based constructivists such as Onuf and Kratochwill This modified framework will from now 
on be referred to as Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism (RBLOC) and is outlined 
in Chapter Two.  
The rationale behind using an RBLOC approach is twofold. Firstly, it fundamentally 
incorporates language, in the form of speech acts, into its framework which is essential in this 
particular study dealing with the influence of anti-Western-imperialist rhetoric. Secondly, as 
Howard (2004:805) proposes: “[A] language based constructivist approach is useful for 
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explaining differences in international outcomes – revealing not only that they occur, but how 
they occur”. This is vital to creating a model that could identify and detail the effects of anti-
Western-imperialist considerations, as a yet to be a seriously considered variable, on South 
African decision-making in the Mbeki era. 
Continuing with the analogy between this study and FPDM, the RBLOC model will be 
constructed in such a way as to “… seek patterns in group / bureaucratic processes that can be 
isolated across a set of historical case studies, on the basis of which one can make both general 
predictions and general recommendations for present day foreign policy decision making” 
(Hudson & Vore, 1995:221). This entails examining two different case studies, Zimbabwe and 
Sudan, spanning ten years of South African foreign policy practice under the auspices of 
President Mbeki, in order to isolate anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a common 
variable in both cases. 
While the RBLOC model allows for identifying and gauging the level of impact of the anti-
Western-imperialist variable in each case study, it does not explain why such a variable would 
have an impact on the way events unfolded. For this purpose Securitisation Theory is used. 
Although Securitisation Theory is usually centred on intra-state level decision making, it can 
be moulded to the inter-state level decision-making, as shown in Chapter Two. When 
Securitisation Theory is broadened to inter-state relations, or perhaps in this case it would be 
more precise to say regional level, it corroborates the existence of anti-Western-imperialist 
foreign policy considerations, as well as explains, by conceptualising ‘referent objects’ and 
‘existential threats’, and the relationship between the two concepts, how anti-Western-
imperialist rhetoric is able to influence South African interventions in African affairs. 
In conclusion, this study will be making use of the following three interconnected theoretical 
frameworks within IR: 1) FPDM theory is used as the theoretical grounding of the whole thesis 
but will not be used practically throughout the study, as the related theories 2) Rule Based, 
Language Orientated Constructivism, and 3) Securitisation will be used as frameworks which 
answer the questions what influence anti-Western-Imperialism considerations have on SA 
foreign interactions and why it has this influence.    
How these frameworks are methodologically employed to answer the research questions is 
explained in the following section. 
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1.3.2) Research Methodology 
To establish the influence of anti-Western-Imperialism within the stated confines of this study, 
two case studies will be analysed and compared. A comparative case approach is necessitated 
by the aim of this work which is to identify and construct an overarching framework of Mbeki’s 
foreign policy in Africa. Previous works on the topic of Mbeki and the influence of anti-
Imperialism on his foreign policy would usually focus on a single case study and make only 
passing reference to other comparable situations, thereby negating the possibility of a 
structured and sound overarching framework constructed from a foundation of comparable case 
studies. Therefore, the more comparable case studies that share similar results when subjected 
to the specific methodological approach used within this thesis, the more convincing the 
argument for an overarching structure becomes. Unfortunately, the scope of this thesis does 
not allow for as many case studies as what could be considered exhaustive, but it does allow 
for at least two, which for the purposes of the study is adequate.  These cases are South Africa’s 
reversal of disapproval during the looming Zimbabwean crisis in 2002 and its support of the 
Sudanese government’s dubious actions during the crisis in Darfur in 2003, despite the 
international outcry that followed. 
These particular cases, Zimbabwe and Sudan, were selected because of their respective 
significance. Thabo Mbeki’s support of Robert Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF party during 
the Zimbabwean crisis, and his insistence on using Quiet Diplomacy in an attempt to mitigate 
the situation, is often considered one of the worst foreign policy failures of his political career 
therefore making it integral to any study on SA foreign policy during his term. Similarly the 
Darfur crisis is significant because, as with Zimbabwe, South Africa’s response was considered 
“… not only objectionable, but also baffling and anomalous” (Nathan, 2011:56) presenting 
itself as another interesting and relevant case in the search for the hidden influences behind 
South Africa’s ambiguous foreign policy practice.  
Two separate RBLOC language games will be constructed, one for each case study. Each of 
these language games forms a dialogue between two or more players which consists of certain 
amount of speech acts (which are explicit actions, verbal or  non-verbal) for each side of the 
dialogue. These speech acts represent alternating moves in a rationally constructed language 
game that seeks to emulate the actions and motives of the players concerned. The players in 
each game are considered to be the South African government on one side and the respective 
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national government from the two case studies (or other relevant actors) on the other. Although 
no man can truthfully profess to know the real motives of another, informed deductions and 
extrapolations are used in lieu of explicit statements of intent and motive. This necessitates a 
significant amount of background or contextual knowledge from which to construct rationally 
sound speech acts. This background knowledge and contextualising information is gathered 
from various and numerous primary and secondary sources, such as official government 
documents, newspaper articles, or academic journals which, when pooled together and 
analysed through informed opinion, can garner the insights needed to construct a rational, 
coherent, and insightful language game.  
A typical language game will play as follows. Firstly, background knowledge regarding the 
specific case and the actors involved will be provided which serves to establish a set of 
explicitly stated rules used to dictate the interactions of the language game. These rules have 
to be relevant and are garnered from explicit statements made by the involved governments. 
For example, ‘any country is entitled to sovereignty and none should fear intervention into its 
domestic affairs by another’ would be a pre-conceived rule dictating the actions and responses 
of the South African government, as established in explicit statements on its foreign policy. 
Numerous rules are identified for both players and starting with the first speech act that initiates 
the language game, continuing thorough subsequent alternating speech acts and responses of 
each player, these rules are either invoked or conflicting rules refuted. Through the systematic 
process of a dialogical analysis that seeks to construct rational meaning from the 
contextualisation of background knowledge, as well as the invocation and refutation of explicit 
rules by the players, new ‘implicit’ rules can be established. These implicit rules are rationally 
formulated and constructed from analysing the interactions between the players involved and 
serve as game specific rules that dictate the course of that particular language game. Through 
the analysis of the two separate language games attempted in this study, anti-Western-
imperialist considerations, as a common implicit rule, can be identified and verified for South 
African foreign policy under President Mbeki.   
After the language games were used to identify the existence of anti-Western-imperialist 
considerations, Securitisation Theory and specifically the works of the Copenhagen School, 
will serve as corroborative proof of the anti-Western-imperialist considerations. Securitisation 
Theory will also function as the framework within which the influence of anti-Western-
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imperialist considerations on the South African response to African crises can be rationally 
explained. Firstly, Securitisation Theory will be deconstructed into a linear process whereby a 
final positive state can be used to deduce previous variables by working backwards in a logical 
way, a method which will serve to complement the hypothesis that anti-Western-imperialist 
considerations exist. Secondly, the general framework of Securitisation Theory will serve as 
an explanatory framework that will enable a logical and rational explanation as to why the anti-
Western-imperialist variable identified is able to influence South African interactions on the 
African continent. The further intricacies of Securitisation Theory and the extrapolation to the 
regional level will be explained in Chapter Two. 
It has to be noted at this point that many correlations can be drawn between this research and 
the works of Laurie Nathan. Both this thesis and Nathan contend that Pretoria’s foreign policy 
priorities were strongly influenced by Mbeki’s African Renaissance (Nathan, 2005:371). Both 
also agree that the ambiguity of Mbeki’s foreign policy disappears with the introduction of 
anti-Imperialism (Nathan, 2011). In addition, where this thesis will look at the case studies 
involving crises in Zimbabwe and Sudan, Nathan has previously addressed both situations 
within an anti-imperialist paradigm. However, it is in the theoretical framework and 
methodological approach employed in this study that the biggest departure form Nathan’s work 
becomes apparent. Not only will structured language games be employed to more methodically 
reveal the existence of anti-imperialist considerations as an influential variable in Mbeki’s 
response to the crises in Sudan and Zimbabwe, but Securitisation theory will also be used to 
explain why anti-imperialism considerations are able to influence his response, an approach 
not attempted by Nathan.  
The use of Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism and Securitisation Theory within 
an overarching Foreign Policy Decision Making framework will prove to be adequate in 
answering the central question of this study, but such an undertaking can unfortunately not be 
attempted, within the scope of this thesis, without certain limitations.  
1.4) Limitations and Delimitations  
Taking into account time and length constraints, this study will only focus on South African 
foreign policy, and specifically how it pertains to certain interactions within the African 
continent. The focus is on cases where the foreign policy ideals of State Rights conflict with 
those of Human Rights in response to human rights violations. Therefore, this study does not 
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presuppose to pertain to all relations with the rest of the world or to all manner of foreign 
relations throughout Africa.  
Within the African continent, the study is further limited to the analysis of two case studies of 
South African political interactions. These two cases, involving Zimbabwe and Sudan 
respectively, are diverse in terms of geography and level of interaction, whilst still sharing a 
high level of foreign policy significance to accurately depict a holistic picture of South African 
foreign policy in practice during the presidency of Mbeki.  
Furthermore, the two case studies are representative of the foreign policy and presidency of 
only one of the three democratically elected South African presidents: Thabo Mbeki. However, 
as noted in Section 1.2, the length of Mbeki’s term, and his undeniable influence on 
contemporary SA’s foreign policy can be considered indicative of contemporary foreign policy 
as a whole.  
Also note that this study is limited to studying the influence of a single variable, anti-Western-
imperialist considerations on the interplay between the South African government’s foreign 
policy ideals of respecting state sovereignty and respecting human rights on the continent. This 
is not to say that other variables or factors do not influence this relationship, merely that they 
have been purposefully excluded for the sake of isolating this particular variable.  
1.5) Theoretical and Practical Significance of the Study 
It is hoped that the results of this study and its successful application of numerous theoretical 
frameworks could prove to be significant in the field of IR. The possible significance, both in 
the theoretical as well as the practical aspects of IR, is detailed in the following paragraphs. 
Firstly, the significance of working within a FPDM framework can be stated as follows: 
An analysis of foreign policy decisions can uncover the cognitive processes that lead to 
foreign policy making and “get into the minds” of leaders who make the decisions. It 
can also help identify unique and general patterns of decisions and generate insights 
about leadership styles and personalities that cannot be revealed through a systemic 
approach to foreign policy analysis. Such an approach to foreign policy analysis has the 
potential to make a broad and important contribution to the study of international 
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relations. FPDM can provide deeper understandings of biases, motivations, and 
perceptions.                                                                      
 (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010:5-6) 
This study, therefore, aims to provide a deeper understanding into the motives of the South 
African government in its relations on the African continent, at least within the context of 
Mbeki’s presidency. Also, to provide clarity to an otherwise ambiguous and confusing situation 
that is regularly perceived as a disconnection or inconsistency between South African foreign 
policy in theory and practice. Finally, to accomplish the previous two tasks in a manner that 
logically establishes anti-Western-imperialistic considerations as a variable, able to influence 
South African foreign policy practice in the Mbeki era, continuing the work of many great 
scholars before.  
Secondly, the use of RBLOC theory (a detailed explanation thereof can be found in Chapter 
Two) to systematically and logically identify a variable such as anti-Western-Imperialism in 
the context of South African foreign policy appears to be a novel approach that, if successful, 
could possibly lay the foundation for a systemic and rule-based model within which future 
simulations can be attempted. Whilst it should by no means be considered a perfected or 
flawless model, it does provide the basis for a structured approach to IR that relies on the 
chronological modelling of speech acts and responses that can be supplemented in future.  
Thirdly, Securitisation Theory (also detailed in Chapter Two) is used to explain the disparity 
between foreign policy in theory and foreign intervention in practice which plagues South 
African foreign policy. The results thereof add to the growing data available within 
Securitisation Theory for the purpose of a better “… shared understanding what is to be 
collectively referred to as a threat and what measures can be taken to temper such threats” 
(Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998:26), a task considered vital by the fathers of the Copenhagen 
School of the Securitisation Theory - Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. 
Lastly, as was noted in the introduction, the fact that South Africa is accredited the status of 
regional hegemon in Southern Africa (and some would argue the rest of Africa) entails certain 
roles that the country plays in the region, one of which is “… establish[ing] the ‘rules’ of 
international relations and uphold[ing] the status quo structure governing relations between 
states” (Szayna, Byman, Bankes, Eaton, Jones, Mullins, Lesser,  & Rosenau, 2001: 46). If SA 
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is establishing rules and dictating the ‘status quo’ governing relations between African states, 
then reducing the ambiguity as to what the rules are, and what influences them and why, is 
significant not only for the individuals that operate within the regional inter-state sphere, but 
also those academics that seek to study them.  
The proposed significance of this study is not only limited to an improved theoretical 
understanding of FPDM, the viability of a RBLOC theory in the South African foreign policy 
context, and the applicability of regionalised Securitisation Theory, but it is also practically 
significant in providing individuals with a clearer understanding of the regional rules that South 
Africa inevitably creates in its role as regional hegemon.     
1.6) Thesis Structure 
The following section lists the chapter headings of the rest of this document and provides a 
brief description of each. 
Chapter 2: Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism and Regionalised 
Securitisation Theory  
Chapter Two of this study pertains to the explanation of the constructivist theories of Rule 
Based, Language Orientated Constructivist and Securitisation which will be used throughout 
this study. Both of these theories are somewhat amended and their scopes broadened to suit the 
needs of the study. The details of which will be provided in the chapter, accompanied by a brief 
background on the historical academic underpinnings of both theories. 
Chapter 3: Brief History of Post-Apartheid South African Foreign Policy (1994 -2008) 
Chapter Three highlights the most salient principles of the first 14 years of post-apartheid South 
African foreign policy spanning the presidencies of both Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. 
The pertinent information compiled within this chapter will be used as background information 
for the language games conducted in the subsequent chapters.  
Chapter 4: Case Study One: The South African Response to the Economic and Political 
Collapse of Zimbabwe in the 21st Century 
& 
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Chapter 5: Case Study Two - The South African Response to International Allegations of 
Genocide in the Darfur Region of Sudan (2003 - ) 
Both these chapters will follow the same outline as to how they are constructed. Background 
knowledge, accumulated from Chapter Three and various other primary and secondary sources, 
on the respective case will be provided and contextualised followed by a rationally constructed 
language game derived from this knowledge. A thorough dialogical analysis will follow the 
language game which will serve to establish certain implicit case-specific rules.  
Chapter 6: Western-Imperialism – an Existential Threat Buried in the Psycho-Cultural 
Disposition of Mbeki 
The sixth chapter will combine the results of the two case studies in the preceding chapters in 
an attempt to conclusively establish anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a possible 
variable in influencing South African foreign relations in Africa. This will be accomplished by 
comparing the data garnered from the case studies and conducting a comparative analysis, in 
order to identify the commonality of an anti-Western-imperialist variable. Thereafter, 
Securitisation Theory will be employed to ascertain why and how anti-Western-imperialist 
considerations are able to influence foreign policy. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The seventh and final chapter includes a summary of all the findings and presents them in a 
logically ordered and interconnected fashion.  
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Chapter 2: Rule Based, Language Orientated 
Constructivism and Regionalised Securitisation Theory 
Two different theoretical frameworks will be utilised in this study in order to best achieve the 
dual objectives of 1) amassing substantial evidence in support of anti-Western-imperialist 
considerations as an influential variable in SA’s foreign policy context and 2) offering a 
rational and logically deduced reason why and how it is able to exert such influence. The first 
of these is a constructivist approach that is informed by the importance of language and speech 
acts, governed and constrained by certain social rules, and is referred to as Rule Based, 
Language Orientated Constructivism (RBLOC). The second theory is Securitisation Theory, 
which details the processes and relationships of the involved actors and objects in the 
securitisation of an issue which, if successful, concludes in political actors being freed from 
normal political and / or societal constraints when responding to the particular issue.  
The two theories, RBLOC and Securitisation, both offer frameworks that are firmly situated in 
the constructivist realm of speech acts, language games, actors and audiences. Where RBLOC 
theory is useful in the identification of the anti-Western-Imperialism variable central to this 
thesis, so too is Securitisation Theory useful in explaining how and why such a variable holds 
influence. Furthermore, both frameworks are characterised by a structured approach that relies 
on logical extrapolations and deductions that are comprehensively modelled, creating a 
tangible structure. It is because of the shared constructivist (agreed by many experts in the 
analysis of SA foreign policy to be the most applicable in their field, as stated in the 
introduction) and structured (useful for achieving the stated goal of creating a tangible 
overarching framework for the influence of anti-Western-Imperialism on contemporary South 
African foreign policy) nature of these two theoretical frameworks that they complement each 
other and are therefore best suited to offer the answers that this study demands.  
The theoretical underpinnings and background of both these frameworks will be discussed in 
this section, as well as how they are related to achieving the objectives of this thesis. 
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2.1) Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism 
The examination of various texts regarding a RBLOC approach to International Relations 
uncovers a recurring trend of reference to the works of Onuf as well as Kratochwill entitled 
World of Our Making and Rules, Norms and Decisions respectively, both of which were first 
published in 1989. This comes as no surprise when one considers these books are “…widely 
cited as constructivism’s foundational texts” (Onuf, 2002:127). A comparative analysis of both 
texts suggest that international relations exists within a unique world governed by its own set 
of rules which not only governs the use of language but is also itself constituted by the language 
used by the agents within it (Onuf, 2002:126; Kratochwill, 1995:21-45). People use speech to 
become agents in the world of language which enables them to “…express their wishes, to 
translate their wishes into goals, and finally to act on their goals” (Onuf, 2002:127), all of which 
is only meaningful within a world of language governed by rules that creates an 
intersubjectively understood context (Kratochwill, 1995:24).  
 
With regards to the aforementioned conceptualisation, Frederking (2003:365-366) asserts that 
rule-based, language-orientated constructivists make two fundamental claims. Firstly, that 
social arrangements make up the structures of world politics and that these arrangements 
simultaneously tell agents within these structures what is possible as well as what to do. Once 
again these arrangements are governed by social rules, which include beliefs, norms and 
identities that constitute and regulate all aspects of world politics, altogether existing in the 
shared meanings of their users which are subsequently reproduced through their practices. 
Secondly, rule-based, language-orientated constructivists assert that “communicatively 
rational” (Frederking, 2003:366) agents use speech acts to construct, invoke and contest social 
rules within any social arrangement. Communicative rationality refers to the constructivist 
argument that all agents are bound to implicit validity claims within any speech act, which 
include claims of truth, appropriateness and sincerity. An appropriate example of the implicit 
validity claims inherent within a communicatively rational speech act can be found in the 
following speech act. “The U.S. is the current global hegemon”. This assertion conveys a truth 
claim (that such an assertion is indeed true), an appropriateness claim (that I am right to makes 
such an assertion), and a sincerity claim (that I believe this assertion to be true). Others may 
then accept or challenge any of these validity claims. For instance another communicatively 
rational agent could contest the truth claim of the previous speech act and assert that America 
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is in fact not currently the global hegemon. A communicatively rational agent is thus an agent 
that performs “… speech acts, conveys validity claims, and act[s] on the basis of mutually 
recognised validity claims” (Frederking, 2003:366). “When actors agree to the validity claims 
of a speech act, the binding effect of language motivates them to co-ordinate subsequent actions 
with the speaker …” (Frederking, 2003:366) and it is this focus on validity claims within 
speech acts that allows a rule-orientated, language-based constructivist to analyse “… the 
process through which speech acts construct and / or challenge social rules” (Frederking, 
2003:366).  It also has to be noted that communicative rationality should not only be limited to 
verbal speech acts, but can also be applied to physical, nonverbal acts, which are usually also 
subject to the same inherent validity claims (Frederking, 2003:367). Non-verbal speech acts 
would include any acts that convey or communicate an assertion and are subject to the same 
implicit validity claims of truthfulness, appropriateness and sincerity that verbal speech acts 
are. For instance, in Chapter 4 the language game between South Africa and Zimbabwe is 
opened with a non-verbal speech act by the Zimbabwean government – the expropriation of 
white-owned farmlands. Consulting contextualising background information, it is evident that 
the expropriations were prefaced and indeed justified at the time by Western-imperialist 
rhetoric from Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and thus the non-verbal speech acts 
conveys a certain communicative assertion (white owned farmlands are an example of 
Western-Imperialism and therefore Zimbabwe is justified in expropriating them) which 
adheres to the validity claims of truthfulness (Mugabe believes this assertion to be true), 
appropriateness (Mugabe believes he is right in making this assertion) and sincerity (Mugabe 
believes this assertion to be true) as a verbal speech act would.  
 
The analysis of these speech acts does not however occur with regards to a singular, isolated 
speech act. Rather it occurs within a constructed “language game” which strings together 
different speech acts in the form of a negotiation. This language game can then be analysed by 
using a method referred to as dialogical analysis. 
 
2.1.1) Language Games and Dialogical Analysis 
Dialogical analysis is an interpretive approach that attempts to explain particular actions of 
communicatively rational agents by identifying the social rules agents follow by “... showing 
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the coherence between speech acts and the [identified] rules within a particular social 
arrangement” (Frederking, 2003:369). 
 
The works of Duffy, Frederking and Tucker (1998) and Frederking (2003) provide formal 
models of the dialogical process and, although each differs slightly from the other, the main 
concepts and steps taken remain the same. Firstly, one has to specify any background 
knowledge necessary to the understanding of the dialogue which is being analysed. This 
background knowledge serves as the underlying set of rules, or context, that governs the 
interactions as hypothesised by the analyst. It is the existence of these rules that will be tested 
during the dialogical analysis. Note, however, that these rules should be either “... (a) politically 
non-controversial facts or (b) beliefs of the relevant party supported by archival evidence” 
(Duffy et al., 1998:272). 
 
Secondly, one has to acquire and accumulate relevant explicit interactions, verbal and / or non-
verbal, which will be converted into speech acts and form part of the dialogue being analysed. 
Thereafter, one has to start with dialogical analysis beginning with a pragmatic analysis of 
these speech acts. This part of the dialogical analysis forms the bulk of the analysis. Here the 
analyst has to construct “... inventories of [pragmatic] propositions [which are] conveyed 
implicitly by each party” (Duffy et al., 1998:272). These explicit propositions must be relevant 
to the specific issue at hand, as well as relevant within the context of the interaction 
(Frederking, 2003:369-370) as defined by the established background knowledge. It is also 
assumed that these propositions inherently convey all three validity claims of truthfulness, 
appropriateness and sincerity (Frederking, 2003:370). The validity of the claims within speech 
acts or propositions can however be disputed by the other agent and it is these disputed speech 
acts / propositions that form the basis of the next step in dialogical analysis: argument analysis. 
 
Argument analysis “... isolates and formalises the disputed propositions ...” (Frederking, 
2003:370), which in turn reflects a dispute of the social rules generated in the pragmatic 
analysis. This analysis formalises the disputed propositions into an argument or negotiation, 
where assertions are made and the validity claims of these assertions are challenged, and 
summarises the flow of interaction. Argument analysis can also yield implicit propositions, 
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which are then to be added to the existing inventory of propositions derived from the pragmatic 
analysis. 
    
The final step is what Duffy et al. (1998:272) refers to as “formal theory-proving”. This tests 
the model to see if the actual outcomes of the dialogue for a specific agent follow logically 
from the contents of the belief inventories (social rules). In other words, does the eventual 
policy position taken by an actor rationally and logically derive from the preceding dialogue? 
These final policy positions are also referred to as “action theorems” (Duffy et al., 1998:272). 
For instance, in a negotiation regarding the terms of trade between two actors, the terms 
accepted by actor X would be that party’s action theorem whilst the terms accepted by actor Y 
would necessarily be their action theorem. These action theorems are then tested against the 
previously established rules and the propositions that substantiate them in order to see if the 
action theorem is indeed the logical conclusion of these rules, thereby vindicating the existence 
of those rules and proving the analyst’s initial hypothesis regarding the social rules that govern 
that specific dialogue. A summation of the four-step process can be found in Figure 
1.                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                  
The ability of the rule-based, language-orientated constructivist approach in explaining certain 
foreign policy actions through the use of contextual language games is what makes it crucial 
to this study. However, here the emphasis is not on proving the logical validity of the eventual 
policy actions / action theorems, but rather the implicit rules garnered in the dialogical analysis 
that validates the theorems. Normally such language games, at least as proposed by Howard, 
are aimed at “… [revealing] the different rules that create differences within a family of 
otherwise similar situations and the possibility of different outcomes …” (Howard, 2004:805), 
however for the purposes of this study, identifying the same rule within two different situations 
will serve to establish this, previously hidden, rule as one that remains persistent throughout 
the same family of games. This approach does not necessarily depart from Howard’s general 
theory, rather it just increases the scope. Where Howard would use language games to explain 
why an actor would pursue a different course of policy action in two seemingly similar 
situations (or ‘family of otherwise similar situations’ as he refers to it), this study will seek to 
establish, through the use of language games, a sub-family of situations that adhere to a specific 
set of common rules. In other words, if one were to consider ‘gross human rights violations’ as 
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a family of otherwise similar situations with an overarching set of rules, then this study seeks 
to identify ‘gross human right violations on the African continent with the presence of anti-
Western-imperialist considerations’ as a sub-family of situations that will result in a different 
policy decision (than those taken in the main family) for South Africa, the resulting policy 
decision changed because of the presence of anti-Western-imperialist considerations.  It is the 
implicit social rule of ‘anti-Western-imperialist considerations’ that needs to be identified in 
both language games in order to validate this hypothesis. Identifying this rule will provide the 
basis for the construction of an overarching social rule that, while remaining implicit in speech 
acts, can be considered explicit in background knowledge in a sub-family of similar games. 
games.                                                                                                                         
Once anti-Western-Imperialism has been identified as a social rule that is able to influence the 
foreign policy of South Africa then Securitisation Theory is employed to make sense of why 
and how it is able to influence.  
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Figure 1. Summary of the 4-Step Dialogical Process Model (Author’s own design) 
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2.2) Securitisation Theory 
Securitisation Theory mainly stems from the works of Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, whose 
collective works on Securitisation Theory has become known as the Copenhagen School of 
Securitisation Theory.  Classical Copenhagen School of Securitisation Theory can be 
deconstructed into five key variables as defined by Cabellero-Anthony and Emmers (2006: 21-
23): 
1) Security: A socially constructed concept about survival wherein an issue is presented 
as posing an existential threat to a designated object. It is securitized when articulated 
by a securitizing actor. 
2) Securitizing Actor: These are governments, international organisations or civil society 
actors that scrutinise an issue by articulating the existence of threat(s) to the survival of 
a particular referent object. 
3) Referent Objects: These can be individuals or groups (refugees, victims of human 
rights abuses, etc.) as well as security issues like the state (military security) national 
sovereignty and ideologies (political security), national economies (economic security), 
collective identities (societal security), or species or habitats (environmental security) 
that possess a “legitimate” claim to survival and whose existence is ostensibly 
threatened. 
4) Specific Audience: The act of securitization is only complete once the securitizing 
actor succeeds in using the language of security which is the “speech act” to convince 
a specific audience e.g. public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites, etc. 
that a referent object(s) is / are existentially threatened. 
5) Speech Act: This is an important part of the securitization process. According to 
Wæver, with the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. By 
saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering 
"security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, 
and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.  
‘What exactly is security?’ and ‘What makes something a security issue within International 
Relations?’ are the questions answered by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) in their book 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis. According to the authors “… security is about 
survival. It is when an issue is presented posing an existential threat to a designated referent 
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object” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:21). Besides the existential threat that a security 
issue poses, what differentiates it from any other political issue is that the ‘… special nature of 
security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them” (Buzan, Wæver & 
de Wilde, 1998:21). A security issue is thus an issue that poses a threat to the continued survival, 
or further existence, of a referent object and therefore justifies actions outside the normal scope 
of political procedure. Here an existential threat is meant to be understood “… in relation to 
the particular character of the referent object in question” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:21) 
as the “… essential quality of existence [of the referent object] will vary greatly across different 
sectors and levels of analysis; therefore, so will the nature of existential threats” (Buzan, 
Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:22). A referent object in this context could include individuals or 
groups, the state, national sovereignty and ideologies, national economies, collective identities, 
or species and habitats. Lastly, it has to be noted that when speaking of the ‘normal scope of 
political procedure’ reference is made to the societally defined and agreed relation that any 
particular state and its populace has rather than any objective definition of what such a relation 
should be. In other words, an action that would be classified as outside the normal scope of 
political procedure within one country may fall well within that scope in another. The emphasis 
here is on extraordinary measures that depart from societally agreed norms.  
Where a security issue refers to an issue that necessitates action that transgresses the normal 
boundaries of political action so is the act of making an issue one of security is referred to as 
the act of securitisation. Securitisation is performed by a securitising actor, which could be a 
government, international organisation or civil society, who posits an issue in the realm of 
security be presenting it as an existential threat to a referent object, thus necessitating the use 
of extraordinary measures. This move by the securitising actor is referred to as the securitising 
move and constitutes one half of the act of securitisation. According to Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde (1998:25) an “… issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such”. 
Therefore, an issue can only be said to be fully securitised not merely when a securitising actor 
presents a threat that requires extraordinary measures to counter, but only when the target 
audience allows and enables these measures to be taken where it  would normally constrain the 
actions of the actor,. “The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech 
act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that 
is the act” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:26).  
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Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:25) demonstrate securitisation by example of an ordinary 
family that securitises its lifestyle as dependent on keeping a specific job, therefore validating 
the job holder using dirty tricks in competition at the firm in order to retain his / her position. 
Here the parent who has the job is considered the securitising actor who, as a securitising move, 
would present the issue of losing his or her job as an existential threat to the lifestyle of the 
family, which necessitates dirty tricks within the workplace to keep that job. The referent object 
is the family lifestyle, which possess a legitimate claim to survival (at least as agreed upon 
between securitising actor and the audience) and which is existentially threatened by the issue 
of job loss to the point that dirty tricks, extraordinary measures which would normally be 
frowned upon by family, are argued by the job-holding parent to be necessary to ensure that 
the threat is countered. If the other family members (the audience) are sufficiently convinced 
that job loss proves an existential threat to family lifestyle to the point that extraordinary 
measures are allowed, then one could confirm that the issue of job loss has been successfully 
securitised into job security, i.e. the audience has validated the securitising actor’s validity 
claim of on existential threat on a referent object and allows extraordinary measures.  This is 
the crucial part of Securitisation Theory: the act (the speech act) of a securitising actor using 
the word job ‘security’ places the relevant development within in a sphere that allows the actor 
to use any means necessary to block any threats to that security. However,”… it is important 
to note that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security”, but rather by 
the act of placing an issue within this special sphere of security, exempt from ordinary 
constraints, with “… a metaphorical security reference” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde: 1998:27). 
For the Securitisation Theory analyst the task “… is to understand the processes of constructing 
a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat” 
(Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde: 1998:26). It is not to assess whether an issue genuinely threatens 
the existence of a referent object or whether a certain issue should be securitised. Also the 
constructivist nature of Securitisation Theory lends a versatility to the theory which is essential 
to the needs of this thesis as explained forthwith. 
2.2.1) The Versatility of Securitisation Theory  
The Copenhagen School’s Securitisation Theory (CSST) is able to provide a useful framework 
for contextualising South African actions within Africa. However, the scope of the framework 
needs to be broadened slightly for the purposes of such an undertaking. Three aspects of CSST 
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are highlighted as a measure to broaden the scope. Highlighting the first two aspects is an 
attempt to perceive the theory from a slightly different viewpoint, emphasising certain aspects 
that can be rationally deduced from the original theory and serve to bolster the contextualisation 
of SA’s actions in Africa. These include the usefulness of deconstructing the theory into 
variables and constructing a model that enables deduction of certain variables through careful 
analysis and also the recognition of the influence of the psycho-cultural disposition of the 
audience in choosing to accept the securitising move. The third aspect is an amendment to the 
general theory that, while still not actually changing the structure or fundamental basis of the 
theory, does change the scope of the theory to accommodate inter-state actor-audience 
relationships as is necessitated by this thesis. The three aspects are detailed in the following 
sub-sections. 
2.2.1.1) The Value of CSST Deconstruction 
The CSST is useful in that it provides contextualisation of acts that fall outside of the normal 
political scope, not only for the securitising actor, but also for the audience. Returning to the 
hypothetical family case study, it is clear that the audience (the income provider’s family) not 
only allowed the securitising actor (the income provider) to break normal societal constraints, 
but in doing so also deviated from their own normal constraints and procedures. Similarly, 
when the populace of a democratic country supports the invasion of a sovereign state on the 
basis of domestic security it defies normal procedures. Of course the act of securitisation has 
itself created a new context of procedure that falls outside the political norm. Here the 
audience’s response of empowering the securitising actor to act outside normal constraints is 
considered normal as they have been sufficiently convinced of an existential threat to a referent 
object.   
The securitising move of the securitising actor and the subsequent response of the audience 
become part of a collection of variables that together form the entirety of the securitisation 
framework and therefore the theory. Deconstructing the framework into its related components 
- securitising actor, securitising move, referent object, existential threat, and audience response 
(successful or unsuccessful securitisation) - allows for the mapping of their relations as seen in 
Figure 2 (page 32). Presenting the theory as an equation with multiple variables that influence 
the outcome allows for the reverse deduction of variables.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 30 
 
To elucidate the idea of reverse deduction, reference can once again be made to the hypothetical 
situation of the family that is faced with the prospects of losing their current lifestyle due to the 
loss of their main source of income. In the original example, all the variables were already 
presented apriori to the reader as an exemplification of securitisation, but what if all the reader 
knew was who the audience was (the family) and that the audience allowed the actor to act 
contrary to the normal and expected constraints imposed by the audience on the actor (i.e. a 
securitisation has successfully occurred). The only known variables at this point are that the 
family is the audience and that they have allowed the income generator to play dirty in the 
workplace which, it is presupposed, is contrary to the normally expected reaction of the family. 
For the purpose of this example, it is presupposed that condoning dirty play in the office is not 
expected behaviour of the audience (family), but one could also reasonably deduce the same if 
the audience had made previous statements to the effect that they do not condone dirty play. 
At this point we can only deduce that the family is the audience (as they have allowed contrary 
actions) and that the income generator is the securitising actor who is now able to perform the 
contrarian actions with the tacit support of the audience. From this series of events it can be 
deduced that an issue has been successfully securitised, because of the audience’s allowance 
of extraordinary measures. Had the issue been unsuccessfully securitised then these allowances 
would not have been made. From here, however, we cannot yet say exactly why the audience 
(family) supports the securitising actor (income generator) in his dirty tricks (perhaps he / she 
takes personal pleasure in playing dirty) or identify the referent objects and existential threat, 
but what if one had access to communications between the audience (family) and the 
securitising actor (income generator)? Through analysing these communications one could 
pinpoint at what point the audience started condoning the actions of the actor i.e. when did the 
actor make a convincing enough appeal to the necessity of abnormal action to counter an 
existential threat to a mutually agreed referent object. For the purpose of this explanation, it is 
assumed that such communications are available and that these communications show that it 
was at a dinner table discussion that the income generator made mention that if he / she were 
to lose their job then the lifestyle that the family had been accustomed to would severely 
depreciate. If this was the point when the audience (family) started condoning the actions of 
the income generator then we could reasonably deduce that the current lifestyle of the family 
is considered a mutually referent object important enough that when threatened with an 
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existential threat (job loss) it necessitates the extraordinary responses of both the securitising 
actor and the audience.  
For the purpose of this thesis it is important to highlight the following points from the above 
hypothetical case of securitisation. Firstly, that the act of securitisation, as well as who the 
audience and who the securitising actors are, can be deduced from the existence of the 
extraordinary allowances of the audience. Secondly, that through the careful analysis of 
communications, the referent object as well as the existential threat variable within the 
securitisation framework can be reasonably deduced. This deconstructed deduction model can 
be extrapolated from the hypothetical and be applied to real world situations and, granted the 
existence of successful securitisation and the availability of preceding communications and 
actions between the relevant actors and audience, can be used to deduce the objects that the 
audience considers to ‘possess a “legitimate” claim to survival’ (referent object), what 
constitutes an ‘existential’ threat to the referent object, and how securitising actors should 
phrase their validity claims in order for them to be accepted by the audience . All three of these 
variables can, if deduced from the actions of, for instance, inter-state securitisation, serve to 
contribute to the knowledge base within Securitisation Theory. These variables do not only 
serve as dependent variables consigned to one securitisation move, but are also indicative of 
the general psycho-cultural disposition of the actors involved, which is the subject of the second 
of our two deviations from the original Securitisation Theory. 
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Figure 2. Structured Model of Deconstructed Securitisation Variables (Author’s own design)
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2.2.1.2) Discovering a Psycho-Cultural Disposition through Securitisation 
One should not assume securitisation to merely be a linear and objective process of speech acts 
followed by audience acceptance or rejection, isolated as a singular event, but rather a “… 
strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of 
circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the 
power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq, 2005:172). 
Securitisation as an act is situated in a greater conflux of contextualisation between actor and 
audience, the identified threat, and the referent object.  Securitisation, as a theoretical 
framework, is able to serve an alternative purpose, where a successful securitisation becomes 
a telling indicator of the ‘context, psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power 
relation between both speaker and listener’ as referred to by Balzacq (2005:172). If an audience 
changes its normal, presupposed, behaviour to enable a securitising actor to act outside the 
boundaries of accepted political action, then the analyst can infer that an issue has been 
successfully securitised enabling the analyst to make certain rational observations regarding 
the context of the securitisation event, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the 
power relations between actor and audience.  
For the purposes of this thesis, identifying the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience is 
important. Understanding the psychological and cultural disposition of the audience serves to 
contextualise a successful securitisation move by providing insights into why certain objects 
and threats are considered important, or more important than others, and vice versa: identifying 
certain objects and threats that are considered important is naturally telling of the psycho-
cultural disposition of the actor.  Thus being able to establish a clear relation between a 
fundamental convictions of an actor in the securitising framework and the nature of the referent 
object bolsters the validity of the deductions. 
Both of the aspects of Securitisation Theory that were previously highlighted: a) using logical 
deduction to identify referent objects and existential threats important to the audience and b) 
then using these variables to deduce the psycho-cultural disposition of the same audience, are 
focused on the audience actor, rather than the securitising actor, in the securitisation framework. 
In order to cast South Africa in the role of the audience, necessary for deducing the aspects 
previously mentioned, the Securitisation Theory needs to be extrapolated to an inter-state level.   
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For the purpose of extrapolating Securitisation Theory to an inter-state level, inspiration is 
drawn from the works of Haacke and Williams (2008) who attempt to up-scale the 
securitisation framework to the regional level. Haacke and Williams focus on sovereign actors 
within a region combining their mutual state level securitised issues to form a coherent 
collective securitisation. In their work the policies of the African Union (AU) and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are analysed to identify instances of 
collective, transnational securitisation where the AU or ASEAN is cast as the securitising actor. 
However, what if, rather than up-scaling individual state securitisation to a regional level 
through collective securitisation, one were to up-scale the whole process to a regional level. In 
other words, what if within a region one state, rather than the collective regional arrangement, 
were to play the role of the securitising actor and another the role of the audience.   
2.2.1.3) Extrapolating CCST to a Regional Level 
Buzan and Wæver’s very own example of Securitisation Theory, contracted in scope to the 
household level, provides the precedent for the possibility of extrapolation to the regional level. 
Here they provide the basis for securitisation as a theory that does not just apply to the intra-
state level, as long as certain key actors (specifically in term of their relationship) and variables 
exist. Securitisation, in its essence, concerns a securitising actor (whether a household income 
provider or a state) who is normally constrained in some way (societal norms, or political 
constraints) and who, through a referential speech act of ‘security’, creates a validity claim that 
suggests an issue (losing a certain job or the militarisation of a rival state)  is an existential 
threat to a referent object (family lifestyle or sovereignty) which is then accepted by the 
audience (the family or the ruling elite) if they act contrary to normal expectations by allowing 
and enabling the securitising actor acting outside their constraints (playing dirty at work or 
invading another  sovereign state). Using this framework one can transfer Securitisation Theory 
to the regional level as shown by the following example. 
Suppose one were to take a regional grouping, in this case Africa, and position a single 
sovereign state as the securitising actor, but rather than the actions of this state being 
constrained by normal political restraints within the state, it is constrained by international 
norms (for instance the promotion of human rights or state sovereignty). This African state then 
attempts to securitise an external (from outside the regional context) issue by implying an 
existential threat to a regional referent object. Like in the example of the household, the issue 
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is successfully securitised when the audience (in this case the other states within Africa) act 
outside the expected norm in response to the issue and thereby legitimises the African state’s 
extraordinary response to the issue. Note that for the purpose of this thought experiment it is 
not important what the true motives of the securitising actor are, only that an analyst is able to 
identify when a securitising move is made (for whatever reason) and when, and under what 
circumstances, the audience accepts the securitising agent’s validity claim that an issue does 
indeed pose an existential threat to a referent object and thus justifies extraordinary measures. 
Speaking of the audience, Buzan and Wæver and other securitisation theorist regularly refer to 
‘the audience’ as a singular entity that is able to validate the securitising actors actions, thereby 
finalising securitisation, but is logical to assume that the audience in most cases consist of a 
group of individual actors and that securitisation has successfully occurred when the majority, 
or at least the most powerful, have agreed to accept the validity claim rather than a 100% of 
the audience. Although this distinction may be unimportant when dealing with Securitisation 
Theory at the state level, it can be considered important to Securitisation Theory when dealing 
with individual states at the regional level, which constitutes the audience.  
Lastly, to bring the newly formulated regional inter-state securitisation framework in line with 
the subject matter of this research project the following is stipulated. Within the regional 
African context, South Africa, as a member of the relevant securitisation audience has in the 
past acted contrary to the expected norm, as stipulated in previous official documents and 
claims of SA itself, when confronted with human rights abuses on the African continent. We 
can construct the reasoning as follows: that other African states have acted as securitising actors 
by securitising a certain issue which would solicit a response from South Africa that is contrary 
to what is expected. For instance, in the cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan, South Africa reacted 
contrary to the expectations of many IR pundits, local and international media, and as it were, 
the country’s own explicitly stated foreign policy. If this is incorporated into Securitisation 
Theory, it can be seen that it is the referent object and the specific issue that is amiss. This 
thesis hypothesises that the referent object is State Rights (state sovereignty and African 
solidarity) and the specific issue is that of Western-Imperialism. The purpose of this study is 
to use Securitisation Theory to validate the hypothesis that South Africa accepts the validity 
claim from other African countries that Western-Imperialism serves an existential threat to 
regional solidarity and state sovereignty within the region.   
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RBLOC and our newly extrapolated inter-state level Securitisation Theory are to be viewed as 
frameworks within which this thesis will analyse the data that is presented. These two theories 
complement each other in supporting and illuminating various aspects within each theory. For 
instance, where Securitisation Theory can be employed to explain why certain social rules 
within the language games created by RBLOC are able to exert a particular influence, while 
RBLOC theory can pinpoint the assertions that securitising actor makes in successfully 
securitising an issue.  
For a practical example of how the two constructivist theories complement each other, refer 
yet again to the previous example of the family that has securitised job loss. As was noted in 
our previous example, it is often easy to detect that securitisation has taken place (because the 
audience has allowed the securitising actor to act outside of the normal social and political 
boundaries), but, unless explicitly stated, it is not always as apparent as to why the audience 
allowed the securitisation: what existential threat was proposed by the securitising actor as 
threatening which referent object? If we use RBLOC to construct a language games the 
emulates the verbal and non-verbal speech acts up until the point where securitisation occurred, 
we can more easily identify what the referent object was and what existential threat was 
proposed. For instance, if we were to construct a language game for the family faced with job 
loss that recreates a dinner time conversation right before securitisation occurred, then if we 
could show that the family did not accept the validity claim of the securitising actor until he or 
she stated that the loss of the job would significantly decrease the family’s quality of life (for 
example) then we could deduce that in this case the referent object (something that for both 
parties possess a legitimate claim to existence) is most likely the family’s current quality of life 
and the existential threat to this being the possibility the income generator losing his or her job. 
Here RBLOC theory has therefore assisted Securitisation Theory by identifying the most likely 
causes of securitisation. Securitisation Theory, in kind, can assist RBLOC in explaining, at 
least in this thesis, why certain variables identified and shared by specific language games is 
able to exert an influence by positing that variable and the accompanying explanation within 
the sphere of securitisation.    
In this work, RBLOC will be used to logically construct coherent language games (one each 
for the cases studies of Zimbabwe and Sudan), constituting speech acts of the relevant actors, 
which when analysed, will produce the necessary evidence of the influence of anti-Western-
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imperialist rhetoric in the actions and responses of the South African government (and Thabo 
Mbeki) to humanitarian crises on the African continent. Thereafter, Securitisation Theory will 
be used to explain why anti-Western-imperialist considerations has this influence by means of 
casting the South African government as the audience actor in a typical securitisation move 
and using the theory’s relational framework between a mutually agreed referent object, 
legitimate existential threats, and an audience’s psycho-cultural disposition. 
To achieve both of these goals a certain depth of data in terms of background knowledge and 
inter-state communications is required, in order to inform the language games and 
Securitisation Theory as well as some of the assumptions used throughout the course of the rest 
of this thesis. For the relevant background knowledge, we turn to the following chapter, 
Chapter Three, which will detail the most salient parts of South African post-apartheid foreign 
policy between 1994 and 2008 in terms of how it was it was shaped under the presidencies of 
Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki.  
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Chapter 3: Brief History of Post-Apartheid South African 
Foreign Policy (1994 -2008) 
The following is an overview and summary of South African foreign policy during the tenure 
of the first two post-apartheid South African presidents: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. It 
is not meant to be a thorough exploration or in-depth analysis of foreign policy or foreign policy 
decision-making of the period, but rather a brief exposition to set the context for the rest of this 
thesis. 
Primary information and research is supplemented throughout this chapter by the works of 
many respected authors and scholars in the field. The focus of this chapter will be divided 
between the two presidential eras starting with the Mandela years (1994-1999) and following 
with Mbeki’s tenure (1999-2008). Although the focus of this study is on SA foreign policy 
throughout the years of Mbeki’s presidency, the Mandela era will also be explored in order to 
detail the evolution of foreign policy directly after democracy, which laid the foundation for 
Mbeki’s influence. 
The focus of the Mandela era section is on describing the historical foundations of post-
apartheid South African foreign policy by emphasising the partial inheritance of apartheid 
policy and the role of increased multi-literalism and regional hegemony. Furthermore the early 
foreign policy incongruence of displaying African solidarity versus increasing economic 
development (sometimes at the expense of the rest of the continent), compounded by a lack of 
recognition of authority by the neighbouring states,  is also explored as means to contextualise 
the Mbeki presidency that followed. 
The section on the Mbeki presidency is aimed at describing and contextualising the various 
aspects of Mbeki’s foreign policy that will be most salient within the methodological 
frameworks of RBLOC and Securitisation Theory, which will be used in this study. Therefore 
the Mbeki section will: eliminate any doubt of South African being an Emerging Middle Power 
characterised by ‘niche diplomacy’ and interfering in global issues beyond its concern; 
highlight the Presidentialist aspect of Mbeki’s presidency that sought to centralise foreign 
affairs and policy decision within the president’s office; re-iterating the undeniable influence 
of Mbeki’s African Renaissance on South African  foreign policy; exposing the selfish 
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‘National interest’ of South Africa in its renewed commitment to Africa, ultimately leading to 
concerns of hegemonic legitimacy from the region.    
The description of the two presidential eras will be structured in such a way as to illuminate 
the natural evolution of foreign policy through the tenures of Mandela and Mbeki and how 
each aspect is influenced or supplemented by the next to form the interconnected morass of 
presidential personality, national self-interest and geo-political considerations that would 
eventually lead to the great incongruence between South African foreign policy in principle 
and foreign policy in practice.  
3.1) The Mandela Years (1994-1999) 
3.1.1) 1994: Democratisation of South Africa and its Foreign Policy 
Following the first fully democratic South African elections in April 1994, the newly elected 
ANC party, as leader of the Government of National Unity, had certain international 
expectations to live up to. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, head of the ANC and the first ever 
democratically elected president of South Africa, a country beset by a tyrannical minority rule 
for 46 years, was regarded as a paragon of virtue and tolerance by the international community. 
Whilst South Africa, situated at the tip of a continent rife with habitual warfare and conflict - 
a country that managed a remarkably peaceful transition from a minority ruled apartheid system 
to a fully-fledged democracy - was to become a beacon of hope for a Western community who 
had grown tiresome of the ills and ailments of the ‘Dark Continent’. The process of 
democratisation did not however end at the ballot box, but also spilled over into other spheres 
of government such as foreign policy, with an ANC promise to democratise foreign policy 
decision-making. A promise bolstered by initiatives such as turning the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (PCFA) into a core institution for broad public participation. 
Displaying even further commitment to the democratisation of the foreign policy decision-
making process, the DFA published a document entitled the South African Foreign Policy 
Discussion Document in 1996 which had solicited input from academics and non-
governmental institutions alike. Such a democratisation of the foreign policy office was in stark 
contrast to the apartheid foreign policy decision-making process which had previously been 
described as ‘oligarchic-bureaucratic’ (Geldenhuys, 1984:2) where decision-making was left 
to a small group of senior ministers and officials.  
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Although the ideological differences between the pre- and post-apartheid governments could 
not be starker, the general foreign policy had surprisingly remained relatively unaltered after 
the 1994 elections. Already in 1989 did Neil van Heerden, Director General of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, usher in South Africa’s ‘New Diplomacy’, considered a foreign policy 
review necessitated in response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ and its impact on 
Soviet-African relations (Evans, 1999:255). The apartheid government at the time was moving 
away from the realist ideology of dominant military might characterised by the Total National 
Strategy towards maintaining their regional hegemony through non-coercive policy 
instruments such as diplomacy, trade, and economic co-operation (Evans, 1999:255). 
According to Evans the central tenets of this framework was simple and included the following: 
“… South Africa is part of Africa, African problems must be solved by Africans, Southern 
African states are interdependent and their security is indivisible, [and] regional issues should 
be approached in a spirit of co-operation and good neighbourliness” (Evans, 1999:255-256).    
It was an already Afro-centric foreign policy that the ANC government inherited in 1994 and 
had, according to Evans (1999:266), apart from a few rhetorical flourishes kept the same 
throughout their rule. The similarities between the two eras of foreign policy are easily 
identified by comparing the tenets core to van Heerden’s ‘New Diplomacy’ to the main 
principles of the post-apartheid South Africa foreign policy as stated by Nelson Mandela 
himself in 1993 and later to be simplified and codified in such official government documents 
of the time such as a Department of Foreign Affairs Discussion Document on South African 
Foreign Policy (1996) and the White Paper on South African Involvement in International 
Peace Missions (1998). The various versions of the core foreign policy principles appear in 
Table 1.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Apartheid and Post-apartheid Era South African Foreign Policy 
Principles (Authors own design) 
Apartheid Era Post-Apartheid Era 
Van Heerden’s ‘New 
Diplomacy (Evans, 
1999:255-256) 
Nelson Mandela: South Africa’s future 
foreign policy (1993:87) 
SA foreign policy discussion 
document (1996) & White 
paper on SA involvement in 
international peace missions 
(1998) 
South Africa is part of Africa. 
  
African problems must be 
solved by Africans.  
 
Southern African states are 
interdependent and their 
security is indivisible.  
 
Regional issues should be 
approached in a spirit of co-
operation and good 
neighbourliness. 
Issues of human rights are central to 
international relations and an understanding 
that they extend beyond the political, 
embracing the economic, social and 
environmental. 
Just and lasting solutions to the problems of 
humankind can only come through the 
promotion of democracy worldwide. 
Considerations of justice and respect for 
international law should guide the relations 
between nations. 
That peace is the goal for which all nations 
should strive, and where this breaks down, 
internationally agreed and nonviolent 
mechanisms, including effective arms-control 
regimes, must be employed. 
The concerns and interests of the continent of 
Africa should be reflected in our foreign-policy 
choices. 
Economic development depends on growing 
regional and international economic 
cooperation in an interdependent world. 
 
A commitment to the 
promotion of human rights.  
A commitment to the 
promotion of democracy.  
A commitment to justice and 
international law in the 
conduct of relations between 
nations.  
A commitment to 
international peace and to 
internationally agreed-upon 
mechanisms for the resolution 
of conflicts. 
A commitment to the interests 
of Africa in World Affairs. 
A commitment to economic 
development through regional 
and international cooperation 
in an interdependent world. 
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The foreign policy principles adopted by the ANC were, like those of the ‘New Diplomacy’, 
representative of a changing intellectual climate in the international diplomatic sphere 
following the end of the Cold War. The ANC was not lax in recognizing this shift in global 
thinking, emphasising the emergence of a “New World Order” (ANC, 1992) in its 1992 policy 
document on guidelines for international relations in a newly democratised South Africa. This 
‘New World Order’, according to the ANC, included elements such as: “… the collapse of the 
socialist community of states”, “… the emergence of a uni-polar world …”, “… the division 
of the world in to essentially three major trading blocs …” and “… the marginalisation of 
Africa” (ANC, 1992). These realisations of the changing nature of international relations came 
to mould the subsequent core principles of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy. The 
promotion of democracy internationally was a natural reaction to the acceptance of the death 
of the socialist ideology and was an understandable priority of a country who had struggled for 
so long to obtain it, which can also be said of its commitment to the promotion of human rights. 
Furthermore the commitment to Africa naturally stemmed from the identification of its 
marginalised state in international affairs. These principles were thus pragmatic in acceptance 
of a changing world order, but were however not indicative of unanimity of opinion amongst 
ANC stalwarts.  
 
Evans (1999) identifies three distinct developmental phases of ANC ideology from liberal 
internationalist (1912-1960) to socialist (1960- 1993) and eventually pragmatism (1993-), and 
states that during the creational period of these principles there was a great division between 
“second phase populists and ideologues” and “third phase pragmatists and neo-liberals” (Evans, 
1999:624).  Evidently these ‘second phase’ socialist notions were “… widely perceived both 
inside and outside South Africa to be atavistic and anachronistic” (Evans, 1999:624) and would 
eventually be superseded by the neo-liberal post-cold war foreign policy of the 90s after a series 
of in-house ANC party discussion documents.  
3.1.2) South Africa the Emerging Middle Power: Multilateralism and Regional 
Hegemony 
Part of the new neo-liberal and pragmatic ANC approach to foreign policy included the rapid 
re-integration of South Africa back into the community of nations from which it had so long 
been excluded. This rapid re-entry was characterised by quick and broad admission (or re-
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admission in some cases) to international and regional inter-governmental organisations and 
institutions including:  
 re-admission to the Commonwealth; 
 resuming its seat in the United Nations; 
 joining the G77 
 joining the Organisation for Africa Unity (OAU); 
 joining the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC); 
 joining the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); 
 re-joining United Nations Specialised Agencies such as ILO, WHO, FAO, etc.; and 
 initiating negotiations with the European Union (EU). 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996) 
According to the Department of Foreign Affairs (1996) the number of foreign state and official 
visits to South Africa increased significantly right after the end of apartheid. By 1996 South 
Africa had more than four-fold the amount of diplomatic missions abroad than a mere six years 
before, increasing from 30 missions in 1990 to 124 in 1996 (Barber, 2005:1082).  
The rapid admission to a host of multi-lateral organisations, coupled with the large influx of 
international diplomatic missions, correlated with the Department of Foreign Affairs’ early 
identification of “the growing importance of multilateralism” (DFA, 1996). The emphasis on 
multilateralism led some authors (Cillers, 1999) at the time to conclude that South Africa 
inspired to “middle-power leadership”, which is characterised by foreign policy behaviour that 
promulgates multilateralism. Jordaan (2003:165) would further argue that South Africa 
exhibited traits indicative of an ‘emerging’ middle power: “… semi-peripheral, materially 
inegalitarian and recently democratised … demonstrate[ing] much regional influence and self-
association”.  Emerging middle powers differ from traditional middle powers in that they are 
not anti-hegemonic, in fact displaying “much regional influence” as Jordaan (2003:165) 
concludes, which means these middle powers often are regional hegemons themselves. This 
creates an inherent incongruence (at least in a South African context) between being the 
regional hegemon in terms of economy (and naturally the associated regional influence) and 
prioritising multilateralism in accordance with middle power leadership. The incongruence is 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 44 
 
best explained and most easily observed when examining two specific tenets of anti-apartheid 
foreign policy: African solidarity and economic development through regional cooperation. 
3.1.3) Early Foreign Policy Incongruence: African Solidarity vs. Economic Development 
African solidarity or the prioritisation of African, and specifically Southern African, interests 
in international relations had in the early years of post-apartheid South Africa been regularly 
re-iterated in official state documents that included the six key foundations of foreign policy 
(DFA, 1996; DFA, 1998) as well as by prominent and relevant government figures including 
President Mandela: “Southern Africa commands a special priority in our foreign policy” 
(Mandela, 1993:90) and the first post-apartheid Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo: "[i]n 
terms of foreign policy, Africa is clearly to be a priority in the years ahead" (DFA, 1996). This 
prioritisation laid the foundation for the following convictions. “When policies are formulated 
in South Africa, role players should consider the manner in which a particular issue presents 
an opportunity for South Africa to promote the interests of the SADC region or the African 
continent” (DFA, 1996) and “South Africa should deal with African partners as equals and 
avoid all hegemonic ambitions” (DFA, 1996). As noble and as adherent to a middle-power / 
multilateral foreign policy framework as these principles might be in theory, they were not 
always translated in practice. Mcgowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998) concluded that, as 
evidenced by the archaic Southern African Customs Union (SACU) providing South Africa 
with ‘captive markets’ (Leistner, 1995:270) in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, 
and with a favourable and rapidly growing trade balance of almost four times as many exports 
than imports (in Rand value by 1994) to the rest of non-SACU Africa, South Africa is a ‘selfish 
regional hegemon’ that “… seeks national rather than regional security, tight border controls, 
and the aggressive promotion of exports and investments for economic growth and job 
creation …” (Mcgowan & Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998:178). Although such selfish tendencies 
resulted in South Africa becoming a regional economic powerhouse, it did not however 
translate into diplomatic power within its region. 
3.1.4) South African Regional Diplomacy: Unrecognised Authority   
Internationally, outside the African continent, the newly democratised South Africa and its 
revered leader and paragon of humility and reconciliation, Nelson Mandela, amassed a 
significant amount of diplomatic clout. This clout however would prove not to be forthcoming 
in an African context as Mandela’s diplomatic authority in the African continent would be 
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questioned and undermined numerous times before the end of his presidential term in 1999.  
For example, in 1997 the governments of Angola, Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
intentionally undermined the South African president, in his capacity as chairperson of the 
SADC, by announcing military support for the rebel besieged Lauren Kabila in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo under the umbrella of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security (which at the time was still un-mandated and technically in limbo), going against the 
wishes of Mandela and creating a wide rift between Pretoria and Harare on how the crisis in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) should be dealt with (Cornwell & Potgieter, 
1998:76).  
Another instance of deteriorating South African regional diplomatic legitimacy was caused by 
a self-inflicted diplomatic disaster that courted international criticism - Operation Boleas. In 
September 1998 a 600-strong South African military force entered the sovereign kingdom of 
Lesotho in the midst of election-related unrest, responding to a supposed written invitation by 
Lesotho’s Prime minister which would exonerate its actions in accordance with SADC 
agreements. According to Williams (2000:100) it had in retrospect become clear that SADC 
had not given permission for military intervention in Lesotho as the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security, the only grouping with the legal mandate to authorise such an 
intervention, was still inactive at the time. Accordingly the ‘invasion’ attracted severe criticism 
from both Lesotho and international media (Poku, 2001:152).  
Both the DRC and the Lesotho fiasco are examples of events that raised the levels of animosity 
amongst SADC members towards the biggest economic force within the region. Mandela 
eventually stepped down as President of South Africa after only one term, whether because of 
the animosity from the SADC, old age (he was 75 at the start of his first term as president), 
adhering to earlier promises, or another reason all together is unknown. He was succeeded in 
1999 by his deputy-president Thabo Mbeki. 
3.2) The Mbeki Years (1999-2008)  
3.2.1) South Africa: Undoubtedly an Emerging Middle Power 
By the turn of the 21st century it had become undeniable that South Africa had indeed become 
an ‘emerging middle power’ as Schoeman (2000) and Jordaan (2003) suggest. Defined as “… 
semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate 
much regional influence and self-association”, emerging middle powers “… behaviourally opt 
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for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring 
regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states 
in their region” (Jordaan, 2003:165). Having democratised in 1994 and sporting a GINI 
coefficient of 63.1 in 2005, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World 
Factbook (2014), which made it the second most materially unequal country in the world after 
Lesotho, South Africa definitely qualified as being recently democratised and materially 
inegalitarian. Furthermore although post–apartheid South Africa is cautious to explicitly 
articulate its claim to regional dominance due to historical legacy, it did stake its claim 
economically “… through SACU and SADC at the sub-regional level and the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) at the continental level; and in regional security and 
defence issues as well, through the SADC and the African Union (AU)” (Flemes, 2009: 141). 
 
Middle-power states also “… typically adopt an activist style in that they interfere in global 
issues beyond their immediate concern” (Jordaan, 2003:167). This characteristic of the post-
apartheid state is highlighted by their involvement in various forms of ‘niche diplomacy’. A 
term coined by Australian international policy maker and politician, Gareth Evans, niche 
diplomacy refers the ability of middle-power states “… to concentrate their resources on a few 
issues they perceive as of particular importance to them” (Galligan, McAllister & Ravenhill, 
1997:247). The niche international issues that the South African government had extensively 
pursued at this point included the extension of the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
1997 convention banning landmines, and the Kimberly process, aimed at halting the 
international trade in blood diamonds. According to Hudson, niche diplomacy in South Africa 
actually “… developed to counter the increased centralisation of foreign policy in the office of 
President Thabo Mbeki” (Hudson, 2010:113). The argument that Hudson (2010:113) makes is 
that a centralisation of the foreign policy decision-making in the presidency, indicative of 
presidentalism, necessitated the need for sub-state authorities to pursue areas of concern 
through transnational networks of domestic agencies, as evidenced in the increase of direct 
transborder links of these authorities.  
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3.2.2) Thabo Mbeki: Bringing Presidentalism to Post-apartheid South Africa 
“…[T]he distinguishing feature of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy is how 
obviously policy has moved from the ministry of foreign affairs into the president’s office – 
particularly it seems into the hands of Mbeki” (Vale & Maseko, 1998:284) 
Whereas the government under Mandela had made great strides and efforts in the 
democratisation of the foreign policy process through the PCFA, Mbeki sought to bring policy-
making back under the sole command of the president’s office. The creation of The Policy 
Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) was indicative of Mbeki’s goal of policy 
centralisation. Being one of the four branches of The Presidency, the PCAS was tasked with 
maintaining five focus areas, which were intended to mirror the Cabinet and Director General 
Clusters, of which ‘International Relations and Trade’ is one. The PCAS was established to 
provide “… support and advice to The Presidency on matters related to policy co-ordination, 
implementation and monitoring” (The Presidency Annual Report 2002-2003, 2003:35). The 
International Relations and Trade PCAS unit was meant to provide specialist support to the 
Cabinet Committee on International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS), which it mirrored. 
According to The Presidency, this support was necessary in order to achieve the “… integrated 
planning, decision-making and implementation system …” adopted by the Cabinet Office (The 
Presidency Annual Report 2002-2003, 2003:32). Serving as Chair of the International 
Relations and Trade PCAS, Mbeki had, according to Butler (2009:212), “… dominated the 
cluster of International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS), intervening sometimes heavy-
handedly in foreign investment promotion, the creation of the AU, the Zimbabwe crisis, and 
NEPAD, among other [things]”. 
Van Wyk (2004:122) confirms that the creation of the PCAS on International Relations and 
Trade had the net effect of “… centralis[ing] inputs into the foreign policy process, and to make 
it even less accessible to the public at large”. A sentiment further echoed by 2003 IRPS cluster 
review by the Institute of Global Dialogue, who was tasked with reviewing the government’s 
foreign policy over the previous ten years. During a focus group meeting held in May 2003 
involving a “range of academics”, eleven foreign policy “anomalies” where identified by the 
group, one of which was “[t]he reluctance to fully democratise foreign policy making processes” 
(Institute for Global Dialogue, 2003:4). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 48 
 
Furthermore, although it is stated in the White Paper on South African Participation in 
International Peace Missions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998) that “[t]he President, 
acting on advice from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence, will decide 
in principle whether or not to authorise the deployment of the required military forces” 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:32) in practice, according to Kent and Malan,”… very 
little emphasis is placed on consultation and co-ordination between responsible government 
institutions” (Kent & Malan, 2003:1) and that to date “… decisions continue to be taken at the 
level of the Presidency with little or no prior consultation or input from other levels of 
government, state departments, civil society or Parliament” (Kent & Malan, 2003:3).  
If Presidentialism should be defined as the centralisation of power in one office and person 
then, at least is terms of foreign policy, South Africa under Thabo Mbeki can be considered a 
presidentialist state.  
Mbeki’s preoccupation with foreign policy and his desires to centralise it does not entirely 
surprise if one reflects on his early years as member of the liberation movement. During his 
formative years in exile he was groomed to be the “... articulate and charming face of the 
struggle” (Gevisser, 2010:124) and later became the ANC’s chief spokesperson in his capacity 
as head of the Department of Information and Propaganda. A natural born diplomat, Mbeki 
would travel the world in the late 1970s aside Oliver Tambo, head of the ANC liberation 
movement at the time, setting himself up as a highly successful public relations man.  Mbeki 
had been inextricably involved with ANC foreign policy from a young age and had also at the 
same time made known his distaste for delegation, earning himself the nickname of the 
‘National Interferer’ within the top structures of the ANC because of constant interference in 
other’s portfolios (Gevisser, 2010:166). Mbeki’s desired intimacy with foreign policy decision-
making would eventually lead to the man’s own personal beliefs inevitably becoming 
intermingled with national foreign policy. And one would have to look no further than Mbeki’s 
idea of an ‘African Renaissance’ for a comprehensive summation of such private beliefs.  
3.2.3) Mbeki’s Renaissance: The African Renaissance 
First articulated in 1946 by the Senegalese historian, anthropologist, physicist, and politician 
Cheikh Anta Diop, the African Renaissance speaks of the cultural, economic and scientific 
renewal of the African continent and its people, overcoming all contemporary challenges in the 
process. This concept was renewed, 50 years later, by Mbeki who in 1996 in his now famous 
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‘I am an African’ speech at the adoption of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill 
spoke of his African pride and the unity of the peoples of the continent (Mbeki, 1996). These 
sentiments were more concretely articulated in a 1998 statement regarding the African 
Renaissance which espoused “[t]he beginning of our rebirth as a Continent …” and a “… 
journey of self-discovery and the restoration of our own self-esteem”; in other words “[t]he 
call for Africa’s renewal …” (Mbeki, 1998).  The passionate delivery of speeches at both the 
1998 African Renaissance Conference in Johannesburg as well as the 1999 launch of the 
African Renaissance Institute in Pretoria, coupled with writing the prologue to a 1999 
collection of topical essays entitled ‘African Renaissance: The New Struggle’, are further 
indicative of the passion that Mbeki held for the “… rebirth and renewal of our continent” 
(Mbeki, 1999) through an African Renaissance.  
Analysing five of Mbeki’s more noteworthy speeches, from 1998 – 2001 (Mbeki, 1998; Mbeki, 
1998; Mbeki, 1999; Mbeki, 2000;  Mbeki, 2001), on the issue of the African Renaissance the 
message is clearly articulated and reiterated time and time again that “… [t]he first objective 
we confront in this regard [the African renaissance] is that we must ourselves take on the 
responsibility to answer the question - what are the ways and means that we must adopt to 
ensure that we achieve these objectives!” (Mbeki, 2001). For Mbeki, the renaissance has 
always been for Africans, by Africans.  
The importance that the resurgence of Africa held for Mbeki inevitably translated into the call 
for a renewed commitment to the African continent. A call that would become characteristic 
of foreign policy in the Mbeki presidency. 
3.2.4) South African Foreign Policy: Renewed Commitment to Africa 
The presidentalist nature of the Mbeki regime dictated that foreign policy would inevitably be 
moulded to the Presidents own convictions and one can easily identify the parallels between 
Mbeki’s idea of an African Renaissance and a national foreign policy adherence to, what Fakir 
(2007) refers to as, an ‘African Agenda’. While Fakir admits that the definition of the ‘African 
Agenda’ as a whole remains imprecise and elusive, denoting only general debates on processes 
to promote African democracy and governance and the challenges that they face (Fakir, 2007:1) 
he is however more confident in stating that South Africa’s ‘African Agenda’ “… serves an 
obvious and critical role of setting out the continentalist agenda of the country’s mainstream 
political establishment, as evidenced by the vigorous participation in and support of various 
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collective activities and programmes on the continent” (Fakir, 2007:1). This vigorous 
participation is exemplified by the increasingly prominent role Mbeki played in continental 
affairs during his tenure: chairing the first session of the AU in 2002 and his involvement in 
“… negotiations to settle conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and the 
Comoros, as well as in mediation in Zimbabwe and Swaziland” (Barber, 2005:1089).  
Mediating conflict on the continent related to one of the strategic goals of the ‘African Agenda’, 
which was the search for peace and security in Africa (Fakir, 2007:2). Mbeki had shown the 
willingness to achieve this lofty goal by not hesitating to commit numerous South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) troops to AU and United Nations (UN) peace missions on 
the continent, a commitment which indicated a clear difference from the Mandela years 
according to Barber (2005:1090). The frequency of peacekeeping engagements on the 
continent was however preceded by the ‘White Paper on South African Participation in 
International Peace Missions’ (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998) which was adopted by 
Parliament in October 1999, a document which sought to confirm South Africa’s commitment 
to international peacekeeping missions as well as to standardize the procedures for involvement. 
Although this document spoke of peacekeeping on a wholly global scale it did concede that 
while “… South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritisation afforded 
Africa in South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus of future engagements” 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:20). 
A commitment to continental financial assistance was explicitly stated through the African 
Renaissance an International Co-operation Fund Act (Act No 51 of 2000), which was 
promulgated on 22 January 2001 and provided for the establishment of the African Renaissance 
an International Co-operation Fund. This fund proposed, among other things, to establish a 
platform for the South African government to identify and fund, in a proactive way “… [c]o-
operation between South Africa and other countries, particularly African countries” 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2000:1). 
The vigorous involvement of post-apartheid South Africa in Africa through continuous 
mediation, increased peacekeeping efforts, and financial interventions provide evidence of a 
commitment to the prioritisation of the African continent at the time. A commitment that while 
first being proposed by the Mandela presidency would take on a more tangible and evident 
nature through the foreign policy of Mbeki. This commitment could be attributed to the 
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fulfilment of South Africa’s national interest as argued in a section regarding ‘Peace missions 
and National Interest’ in the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace 
Missions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998). Here it is stated that the key principles on 
which SA foreign policy is based, a “…important component of this definition of national 
interest….” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:20), necessarily dictate that “… it is in the 
South African national interest to assist peoples who suffer from famine, political repression, 
natural disasters and the scourge of violent conflict” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:20). 
The Mbeki government believed that it was in the national interest of South Africa and a benefit 
to all her peoples that the country mediate, build peace on and provide financial support the 
rest of the continent. Such a declaration is not necessarily as altruistic as it would superficially 
appear, depending on how national interest is characterised. 
3.2.5) South African Foreign Policy: the Definition of National Interest 
The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions stated in 1998 
that “… the level and size of South African contribution to any particular peace mission will 
depend on how closely the mission relates to our national interests" (Department of Foreign 
Affairs, 1998:3). What exactly these national interests were at the time remains a contentious 
issue. According to some publications from the DFA, national interest was centred around the 
continental African upliftment, to “… assist[ing] peoples who suffer from famine, political 
repression, natural disasters and the scourge of violent conflict” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 
1998:20) and to “… the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment, to the protection of the 
vulnerable and for the transformation of our continent …” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 
2004:7). This idealist portrayal of foreign policy was however contradicted by more realist 
statements such as in a 1999 address by Jackie Selebi, Director General of the DFA at the time, 
which identified South Africa’s national interest as revolving around two broad themes: “… 
namely the creation of wealth for the country and all her people, and secondly ensuring the 
security of the country and all her people” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999). The latter, 
more realist view of South African foreign policy objectives, and therefore national interest, 
seemed to find traction amongst academics at the time (Flemes, 2009; Alden & Le Pere, 2009; 
Hudson, 2010).  
Some academics argued that although official South African foreign policy was dressed in the 
humanitarian-centric and idealist rhetoric of Mbeki’s African Renaissance, the objectives in 
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practice still remained the fulfilment of selfish materialist national interests such as the relative 
economic growth and national security. For instance, Flemes contends that Pretoria had 
adopted a ‘South Africa first’ regional policy, deriding the contradictory nature of country that 
commits itself to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment on the continent, but at the same 
time promotes the self-serving liberalisation of African economies while it remains “… 
common knowledge that a liberal market policy that neglects redistribution measures leads to 
income inequity with a great proportion of poverty…” (Flemes, 2009:148). This contradictory 
stance helped, according to others Alden and Le Pere, to establish and maintain a vast trade 
discrepancy between South Africa and its continental trading partners, with trade heavily 
skewed in its favour (Alden & Le Pere, 2009:157). And finally, Hudson would go as far as to 
claim that economic imperatives have overridden the moral dimension “… so much so that we 
can now declare that human rights are no longer the driving force behind our foreign policy – 
trade and economic diplomacy are” (Hudson, 2010:109).  
The argument regarding the selfish economic hegemon, which was previously also proclaimed 
in the Mandela era, remains debatable, but for now it is pertinent to remember that despite the 
underlying drives behind SA’s economic growth it still remained an economic powerhouse in 
Southern African at the time, dominating trade and investment in the region. And that this 
hegemonic dominance contributed to the region’s discomfort about South Africa’s leadership 
(Sidiropoulos, 2008:114). A discomfort which eventually translated into regional concerns 
about the legitimacy of South African foreign policy. 
3.2.6) South African Regional Hegemony: Concerns of Legitimacy 
Although almost unanimously accepted further abroad, South Africa’s leadership remained 
questioned closer to home by neighbouring southern African states, some of whom viewed it 
as a “… selfish hegemon bent on advancing its narrow economic interest at the expense of less 
developed African countries” (Flemes, 2009:149). South Africa was perceived as a perpetual 
self-interest seeker of preferential access to developed country markets as evidenced in its 
participation in the US African Growth and Opportunity Act and its Free Trade Agreement 
with the European Union (EU) whilst at the same employing highly protectionist measures 
against neighbouring countries such as against Zimbabwean manufactures (Lipton, 2009:335). 
This approach, coupled with Western encouragement of its regional leadership, garnered South 
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Africa the unwelcome distinction of being referred to as a ‘lackey of the West’ by disenchanted 
neighbours (Schoeman, 2003:358). 
This general environment of suspicion produced South Africa’s ‘softly, softly’ Quiet 
Diplomacy approach under Mbeki, who remained sensitive to criticisms of regional bullying 
(Sidiropoulos, 2008:114). The approach of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe and Sudan where 
characterised by “… South Africa [avoiding] flexing its muscles to compel the incumbents to 
negotiate a resolution in good faith …” and going to “… great lengths to protect the incumbents 
from sanctions or international pariah status” (Sidiropoulos, 2008:115). 
Mbeki’s approach of Quiet Diplomacy in dealing with leaders perpetuating humanitarian crisis   
on the African continent would eventually become the policy that would embody the great 
incongruence between South African foreign policy in principle and foreign policy in practice.   
3.3) The Great Incongruence: Foreign Policy in Principle and Foreign Policy 
in Practice 
The examples of Zimbabwe and Sudan are indicative of the incongruence between Mbeki’s 
national foreign policy in principle as explicitly stated in official government communication 
and foreign policy in practice as witnessed in diplomatic and economic dealings in Africa.  As 
are the contradictions between  South African commitment to the eradication of poverty and 
underdevelopment on the African continent in principle and a seemingly orchestrated 
enforcement of a status quo that sees a large discrepancy in continental trade in the favour of 
South Africa. And again when South Africa’s principled commitment to the promotion of 
human rights and democracy is seemingly superseded by Mbeki’s feeble ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ 
approach in the practice of dealing with the gross violations of human rights and the 
disintegration of democracy. It is the latter incongruence, regarding Quiet Diplomacy, which 
is pertinent to a question that forms the implicit basis of this thesis: Why did Mbeki adhere to 
the failing Quiet Diplomacy despite his explicit and passionate commitment to the promotion 
of democracy and human rights on the African continent? The answer to which is, as the 
research and analysis in this thesis will indicate: because of the substantial influence of anti-
Western-imperialist considerations in shaping Mbeki and South Africa’s foreign policy to the 
African continent. And the following two case studies of Zimbabwe and Sudan will use 
RBLOC to gather substantial evidence to support such a claim, supplemented by the 
background knowledge provided within this chapter.   
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Chapter 4: Case Study One: The South African Response 
to the Economic and Political Collapse of Zimbabwe in the 
21st Century. 
This chapter details the first of the two case studies to be conducted in this thesis. The focus in 
this chapter is on the economic and political crisis that had steadily been developing in 
Zimbabwe since the year 2000, cumulating in an undeniable collapse of the Zimbabwean 
economy by 2007 and a full blown humanitarian crisis at the time. Specific focus is put on the 
foreign policy that South Africa had pursued during and after this collapse. The eventual policy, 
and thus the eventual action theorem of this language game, that Pretoria pursued under 
leadership of Thabo Mbeki, was one of Quiet Diplomacy. This chapter will argue that not only 
was Quiet Diplomacy the only viable and rational recourse left for Mbeki from a set of options, 
thereby reducing the perceived ambiguity of SA foreign policy, but more importantly that this 
was only the case because of the presence of an implicit anti-Western-imperialist principle in 
South African foreign policy that was triggered by the introduction of Western-imperialist 
rhetoric by the Mugabe. What follows is a summary of the events that occurred during this 
crisis and the relevant background knowledge that can be gleaned from and used for 
constructing the language game thereafter.   
 
4.1) South Africa and the Use of ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ during the Zimbabwe 
Crisis 
During the year 2000 the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, commenced with a state 
sanctioned and enforced land reform program that entailed white owned farmlands within 
Zimbabwe being expropriated and redistributed amongst landless blacks. Some analysts 
believe that the land reform program was enacted to divert attention away from Zimbabwe’s 
troubled economy which had already entered “free fall” by 1997 (Taylor & Williams, 
2002:549), whilst others argue that the government’s blatant disrespect for the law of property 
rights directly attributed to the ensuing economic collapse (Richardson, 2005). Regardless, by 
2007 the annual inflation rate was 1,200% and 80% of Zimbabweans lived in poverty 
(Meldrum, 2007). The impending economic collapse that was prevalent during the land reform 
program from 2000 to 2003 rallied opposition parties, especially the Movement for Democratic 
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Change (MDC), within Zimbabwe to openly criticise Mugabe’s competence as ruler of the 
country. These criticisms however were met with large scale state sanctioned attacks and 
forceful oppression of the MDC and its supporters (Dempster, 2003), especially before the 
2002 Zimbabwean elections, which many independent non-partisan observers believed was 
ruled by fear and violence (Analysis: How Free and Fair was the Poll?, 2002). It is the 
combination of the land reform program, the economic collapse, and the suppression and 
intimidation of opposition parties that came to be referred to internationally as the ‘Zimbabwe 
crisis’. 
 
As the Zimbabwe crisis was unfolding, international actors looked to South Africa and Mbeki 
to use its considerable power within the region to address the crisis in Zimbabwe (Graham, 
2006:117; Schoeman & Alden, 2003:1). Rather than intervening directly through military force 
or sanctions, Mbeki opted to not openly criticise Mugabe, but rather convene with him 
privately, a diplomatic method referred to as Quiet Diplomacy (Graham, 2006:117). However 
as the years passed and the crisis within Zimbabwe grew, it became apparent that Mbeki’s use 
of Quiet Diplomacy was not succeeding in changing the Zimbabwean domestic policies and 
that Mbeki had also inexplicably changed his position from non-criticism to open endorsement 
of Mugabe (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:390) as demonstrated by, for instance,  
Commonwealth meetings where he “… accused the prime ministers of the United Kingdom 
(UK) and Australia (Tony Blair and John Howard) of being racist and of being unwilling to let 
black nations take the lead” (Barber, 2005) and Mbeki fighting to protect Mugabe, even from 
opponents within Africa (Malala, 2005). 
 
By the year 2008, when Mbeki resigned as president, the Zimbabwean crisis had been 
unfolding for the past 8 years without any significant change in Mbeki’s policy of Quiet 
Diplomacy. This unwavering commitment to Quiet Diplomacy however has not yet been 
adequately explained by realist theory. Throughout the crisis Zimbabwe had posed a significant 
threat to South African security: it is a politically unstable neighbouring country marred with 
violent opposition oppression; it has been estimated that Zimbabwe’s neighbours have lost ₤25 
billion in revenue due to the crisis (Taylor & Williams, 2002:549); and a reported 1,5 million 
illegal Zimbabwean immigrants have flooded the country since the start of the crisis (Latham 
& Cohen, 2011).  Realist theory would dictate that South Africa, with larger military and 
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economic capabilities, would actively pursue measures of direct intervention, if not militarily 
then at least economically in the form of sanctions. However, realism cannot adequately 
explain Mbeki’s continued use of Quiet Diplomacy coupled with explicit support for the 
Mugabe regime. A rule-based, language-orientated constructivist approach can. 
 
An accurate explanation of Mbeki’s continuous adherence to the policy of Quiet Diplomacy 
coupled with explicit support for Mugabe with regards to the Zimbabwean crisis requires that 
one first provide relevant background knowledge that will provide the context for the pre-
established social rules as well as the reconstructed language game itself. A pragmatic analysis 
of the constructed language game follows and the exercise concludes with a hypothesis test. 
 
4.2) Background Knowledge and Context 
When detailing the relevant background knowledge needed to establish a hypothesis regarding 
a valid set of social rules governing the South African / Zimbabwe dialogue, it is pertinent to 
first start with an exploration of Mbeki’s “African Renaissance”. 
 
As previously mentioned the idea of an African Renaissance was only formally used for the 
first time in a 1997 address by Mbeki, but it resonated equally strong throughout Mbeki’s 
earlier “I am an African” speech of 1996 and since then it has been a major influence on South 
Africa’s African policy (Vale & Maseko, 1998:273). In a statement regarding the African 
Renaissance in 1998, Mbeki neatly conceptualises his idea of an African Renaissance, 
lambasting the popular Western view of Africa as a continent of savages and calling for a 
continental renaissance reminiscent of the ones in Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries (Mbeki, 
1998). Besides the aforementioned speech and statement there are also numerous other explicit 
statements by Mbeki regarding the African Renaissance during the time period from the start 
of his presidency until the beginning of the Zimbabwe crisis, such as The African Renaissance, 
South Africa and the World (1998), Speech at the Launch of the African Renaissance Institute 
(1999), Address on the African Renaissance to the Ghana-South Africa Friendship Association 
(2000), and Address at the Third African Renaissance Festival (2001). Together these can be 
used to construct a comprehensive picture of Mbeki’s own convictions regarding the African 
Renaissance.  
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Although there are undoubtedly numerous principles of Mbeki’s African Renaissance apparent 
under close scrutiny, for the purposes of this thesis only the principles salient to the current 
language game will be identified. The following three principles relevant to this language game 
are particularly evident throughout all of Mbeki’s statements regarding African Renaissance. 
Firstly there is a very strong call for African solidarity throughout Mbeki’s African Renaissance: 
an apparent belief in an Africa for Africans, by Africans. Throughout his speeches Mbeki rarely 
singles out specific countries or groups on the continent, besides to lament particular atrocities 
that had befallen them in the past. Instead he continuously and regularly refers only to the 
singular Africa and the need for the continent to escape the colonialist shackles of the past and 
together ensure the “rebirth and renewal of our continent” (Mbeki, 1999). According to Vale 
& Maseko (1998: 281-282) an Africanist interpretation of Mbeki’s renaissance further 
consolidates the idea of African solidarity, regarding it as the only way to move the continent 
away from being marginalised in the internal system. 
 
Secondly, Mbeki, within almost all of his statements on the African Renaissance, is prone to 
constant reminders of the role that Western-imperialists have played in the subjugation of the 
African continent. Mbeki makes reference to the three periods of Western control: slavery, 
imperialism and colonialism, and neo-colonialism (Mbeki, 1999). He laments that the “… 
colonisers sought to enslave the African mind and to destroy the African soul[,] [t]hey sought 
to oblige us to accept that as Africans we had contributed nothing to human civilisation except 
as beasts of burden” (Mbeki, 1999) and that the “… former colonial powers continued to hold 
in their hands the power to determine what would happen to the African people over whom, in 
terms of international and municipal law, they no longer had any jurisdiction” (Mbeki, 1998). 
For Mbeki the next evolutionary step for Africa is “… from neo-colonial dependence to 
genuine independence and democracy” (Mbeki, 2001). Furthermore he states that the history 
of the continent continues to be “euro-centric, colonial and racist” (Mbeki, 2000) and that the 
West has “… lost all sense of the nobele of human solidarity” (Mbeki, 1999). These constant 
reminders are surely indicative of a perpetual cognisance that Mbeki has of the negative 
influences of Western-Imperialism and colonialism.  
 
Lastly, it is apparent throughout Mbeki’s detailing of an African Renaissance that both the 
promotion of democracy and of human rights throughout the continent is crucial to the success 
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of the renaissance. When defining ‘genuine’ liberation, Mbeki rebukes military governments 
and one-party states as failed attempts at stable systems of governance on the continent and 
that liberation through good governance can only be achieved through the institutionalisation 
of democracy in Africa (Mbeki, 1998). Similarly, in terms of the promotion of human rights 
on the continent, Mbeki speaks at length about enhancing the capacity of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union) to promote just that (Mbeki, 1998). For Mbeki 
it is imperative that Africa, in its own interest, organises itself such that democracy and respect 
for human rights prevails (Mbeki, 2001).   
 
However, not all the principles used for the construction of the rules inherent to this language 
game are as explicitly stated in Mbeki’s speeches on the African Renaissance. Some require a 
little bit more inference on behalf of the reader of Mbeki’s statements. For instance, Mbeki’s 
continued abhorrence to the ideas of colonialism, in any form, coupled with his insistence of 
the value of multilateral forums such as the OAU, empowered to intervene to resolve conflicts 
on the continent (Mbeki, 1998), belies the fact that despite the desire for African solidarity, 
Mbeki still strongly values individual state sovereignty and the right of one state to be free 
from the unilateral influences of another. Similarly the onus throughout his speeches are on the 
use of non-violent diplomatic measures to resolve interstate disputes, either between individual 
states or through continental forums such as the OAU.  South African support of state 
sovereignty and multilateralism, and advocacy of the use of non-violence and diplomacy to 
resolve interstate disputes is according to Merle Lipton (2009:332) further corroborated by 
numerous other political analysts.  
 
The last, but equally important, piece of background knowledge needed to fully and adequately 
propose a set of rules that govern the South African / Zimbabwe dialogue is the popular belief 
amongst some African States that South Africa is in fact an agent of the Western world. 
According to Lipton (2009:33), countries such as Nigeria, Angola and Libya appear to view 
South Africa as a pawn of Western-Imperialism, a sentiment seemingly shared by Mugabe who 
has uses the “ideology of North-South struggle” to brand South Africa as a “… puppet of the 
west and a traitor to the struggle” (Schoeman & Alden, 2003:12).  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 59 
 
4.2.1) Rules 
Considering the background and contextual knowledge previously discussed one can 
legitimately and rationally construct the following set of five social rules that are relevant to 
the following language game between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The rules themselves are 
formulated based on the previously presented assumptions that Mbeki’s psycho-cultural 
disposition is portrayed through explicit statements regarding his ideological adherence to the 
African Renaissance and that the highly centralised nature of foreign policy under Mbeki 
naturally entails that his own psycho-cultural disposition would greatly influence foreign 
policy and therefore the rules of this dialogical game. Therefore, it is imperative that the rules 
themselves logically correspond to the main themes of Mbeki’s African Renaissance. The 
following five rules have been created for this language game and are hereafter presented as 
statements followed by the rationale for the construction of these rules. 
 
Rule 1:  African Solidarity is a desired state in continental affairs. 
This rule is inferred from Mbeki’s perpetual call for a collective African revival, orchestrated 
through interdependent states within the continent.  
 
Rule 2: State sovereignty is highly regarded and no external state should infringe on another’s 
autonomy unless under exceptional circumstances. 
As mentioned previously, the clear distaste for colonialism and imperialism throughout 
Mbeki’s African Renaissance naturally implies a respect for the sovereignty of African states, 
free from the unilateral machinations of other states. This principle is further entrenched in 
documents such as the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace 
Missions (1998) which “… recognises the sovereign equality of all member states …”of the 
SADC  and the 2003 – 2005 DFA Strategic Plan (2004) which states that the “… concept of 
equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations must underpin our relations ”.  
 
Rule 3: Western-Imperialism should be countered where possible 
Following Mbeki’s cognisance of the negative influences of Western colonial and imperialist 
influences, as portrayed through constant public statements to the effect, it is logically inferred 
that Mbeki believes such Western-Imperialism should be countered where possible. 
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Rule 4: Only non-violent and diplomatic means should be used in interstate disputes 
As discussed in Chapter 3, South Africa had by the 21st century begun to exhibit all the qualities 
of an emerging middle power. An important quality of middle power foreign policy is that it 
seeks to reduce conflict within the global system by “involving other like-minded states (in 
terms of the issues at hand) in an attempt to arrive at a workable compromise, usually through 
multilateral channels and institutions” (Jordaan, 2003:167). This aspect of middle power 
foreign policy is closely mirrored in the African Renaissance rhetoric of Mbeki which espouses 
the virtues of collective action through multilateral channels such as the OAU. Naturally then 
it is logical to infer that Mbeki’s emerging middle-power brand of foreign policy would 
advocate only non-violent and diplomatic means to settle interstate disputes. 
 
Rule 5: Democracy and human rights should be promoted and protected where possible.  
This is one of the easiest rules to establish as the need for the promotion of democracy and 
human rights on the continent is regularly stated with clarity throughout Mbeki’s statements 
on the African Renaissance as discussed previously. 
4.3) Reconstructed Dialogue and Analysis 
The following represents a reconstructed language game between South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
It is important to note that this reconstruction is neither a verbatim exposition of any actual 
negotiation that occurred between the two parties nor is it supposed to reflect a single closed-
door negotiation session. Rather this particular language game is reconstructed using explicit 
speech acts (verbal and non-verbal), garnered from a variety of sources, that span the course of 
Mbeki’s nine year tenure as the president of South Africa. This reconstruction is also not 
completely perfect in a chronological sense, as such a dialogue would be lengthy, but rather it 
focuses on the main assertions made by each party and their relevant responses. As such the 
dialogue begins with a non-verbal speech act, the expropriation of farmlands in 2000 and the 
ensuing suppression of political opponents, which is considered as the start of the Zimbabwe 
“crisis”, and ends with South Africa publicly supporting Mugabe whilst still maintaining the 
policy of Quiet Diplomacy. The last proposition is also the action theorem for this dialogical 
analysis and therefore it has to be proven that this policy can logically be deduced from the 
dialogue that precedes it when one takes into consideration the context (social rules) within 
which this dialogue takes place. 
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The reconstructed dialogue reads as follows: 
1. Zimbabwe:  Expropriates land and suppresses political opposition (non-verbal speech 
act). 
2. South Africa: The domestic practices of Zimbabwe are steering it towards an economic 
and political crisis (verbal speech act). 
3. Zimbabwe: The current domestic practises of Zimbabwe are justified and anyone who 
disagrees is an agent of Western-Imperialism (verbal speech act). 
4. South Africa: South Africa will publicly support Zimbabwe, but will continue to 
privately influence the Zimbabwean government. (verbal speech act). 
 
A pragmatic analysis follows that details each speech act including a brief explanation of the 
information and material that substantiates the inclusion of each act, the implicit propositions 
conveyed (referred to as implicatures), and which social rules these implicit propositions 
invoke, construct or contest. 
 
4.3.1) Pragmatic and Argument Analysis 
Speech Act 1:  Zimbabwe (non-verbal speech act): Expropriates land and suppresses political 
opposition.  
 
Starting in the year 2000, the Zimbabwean government forcibly removed white land owners 
from their farms in order to redistribute this land amongst landless black Zimbabweans. In a 
speech on the anniversary of Zimbabwean independence in the same year Mugabe spoke of the 
country’s victory over imperialism and colonialism, but expressed concern that some Western 
countries still abuse the UNSC and regional organisations in pursuit of “… subtle and dirty 
regime change agendas under the guise of supporting democracy, rule of law and human rights” 
(Mugabe, 2001). Here Mugabe refers to the “illegal” sanctions of the West in response to the 
redistribution of land, referred to officially as the indigenisation and empowerment policy 
(Mugabe, 2001). According to Richardson (2005), this expropriation of land commenced under 
the guise of countering the impact of Western-Imperialism as the rationale behind the land 
reformation was to redress the “… British seizure of fertile farmland in the late 1890s, which 
resulted in hundreds of thousands of blacks being, pushed onto lower grade communal lands” 
(Richardson, 2005:541). In the following three years, as land expropriation continued, the 
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Zimbabwean economy completely collapsed to a point where, in 2003, inflation had reached 
500%. This economic collapse can in a large measure be directly attributed to the land reforms 
(Richardson, 2005:542). 
 
Within the same timeframe as the land reform and economic collapse Zimbabwe also 
experienced a state imposed “draconian” security legislation which was characterised by “… 
overt violence, suppression of dissent, and the arrest and torture of opposition political 
supporters” (Dempster, 2003). Most of this political suppression was targeted towards the 
MDC, Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, and its supporters (Dempster, 2003). According to 
the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA, 2008) the run up to the July 
2000 parliamentary elections claimed 34 victims, intimidation and torture of MDC members 
were reported, and approximately 18 000 people experienced various violations of their human 
rights. Although no official explicit statements were ever issued by the ZANU-PF in support 
of political violence or the interference in the democratic process, later legislations and 
amendments serve as evidence to bolster the argument that Mugabe and the ZANU-PF were 
actively using their governmental powers to undermine democratic practices within the 
country. For instance, the year 2002 saw the passing of the controversial Public Order and 
Security Bill and the General Law Amendment Bill. The former allowed for the fining and 
imprisonment of persons found guilty of “[p]ublishing or communicating false statements 
prejudicial to the State” and / or “[u]ndermining the authority of or insulting the President” 
(Public Order and Security Act, 2002). The same document also criminalised the failure to 
produce an Identification Document at “… any public gathering or a public meeting of a 
political nature” (Public Order and Security Act, 2002). The General Laws Amendment Bill 
would amend the electoral act to disenfranchise two to three million Zimbabweans abroad, 
require the consent of authorities for the distribution of campaign materials and require election 
observers to become subject to government accreditation (EISA, 2008).  
 
Implicatures:  
 White owned farmlands are an example of Western-Imperialism and therefore 
Zimbabwe is justified in expropriating them (Invocation: Rule 3). 
 Retaining political power is more important than the protection of Human rights 
and the ideals of democracy (Contestation: Rule 5). 
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Speech Act 2: South Africa (verbal speech act): The domestic practices of Zimbabwe are 
steering it towards an economic and political crisis. 
 
At the start of the Zimbabwean crisis, between 2000 and 2003, Mbeki and the South African 
government was publicly neither overtly supportive nor critical of Mugabe and the situation in 
Zimbabwe.  Mbeki claimed that Zimbabwe’s problems were internal affairs and that the rule 
of sovereignty had precluded it from interference (Schoeman & Alden, 2003:4). Early official 
statements by the South African president would consistently call for the peaceful and 
necessary resolution to the land redistribution crisis in Zimbabwe (DIRCO, 2000; Mbeki urges 
end to land crisis, 6 May 2000; The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, 2001), but 
would never publicly chastise or lay the blame for the crises on Mugabe or the ZANU-PF, 
preferring to remind all Zimbabweans of their common responsibility to find a lasting solution 
to their collective problems (DIRCO, 2002).  
 
However, if publicly South Africa did not denounce Zimbabwe, there is evidence to support 
that Mbeki tried to intervene privately in behind closed doors. In early 2000, Mbeki, together 
with Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, met with President 
Mugabe in a regional summit that would discuss the deepening crisis in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe 
Crisis Summit, 2000). Refusing to accept the “… view among some people that if you shout at 
the President of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe government and make big press statements, big 
headlines, then you have done a good thing” (The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, 
2001), Mbeki would rather resort to writing a 37-page “discussion paper” regarding the 
situation in Zimbabwe which “… set out a series of stark warnings and recommendations …” 
and was presented to Mugabe at the 2001 African Union Summit (Blair, 2008). This 
methodology is in accordance with Mbeki’s policy of Quiet Diplomacy at the time that entailed 
not overtly criticising Mugabe in an attempt to make ‘… President Mugabe more amenable to 
negotiations behind the scenes” (Taylor & Williams, 2002:559).  
 
The closest that Mbeki would come to publicly fault the Zimbabwean President was in a press 
conference held for foreign journalists at the end of 2001 where, in response to a question 
regarding the validity of the upcoming Zimbabwean elections, he responded by stating that “… 
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[c]learly in a situation in which people get disenfranchised, in which people get beaten up so 
that they don't take an honest decision or act according to their political convictions, obviously 
there can't be free elections” (McGreal, 2001).  
 
Implicatures: 
 South Africa contests the validity of Zimbabwe’s proposition that retaining 
political power is more important than the protection of human rights and 
democracy (Invocation: Rule 5). 
 South Africa’s respects Zimbabwe’s right to sovereignty and autonomy 
(Invocation: Rule 2). 
 South Africa will only use diplomatic means in dealing with the Zimbabwe 
crisis (Invocation: Rule 4). 
 If Zimbabwe continues on its current path it will lead to economic and political 
crisis, such a crisis might lead to the exceptional circumstances needed for South 
African to infringe upon Zimbabwean sovereignty (Invocation: Rule 5). 
 
Speech Act 3: Zimbabwe (verbal): The current domestic practises of Zimbabwe are justified 
and anyone who disagrees is an agent of Western-Imperialism. 
 
Since the beginning of the land reforms and the subsequent suppression of political opposition, 
Mugabe and the Zimbabwean state has continuously justified its domestic practices by 
employing the language of Western-Imperialism (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:387). 
Mugabe, throughout various statements, would ask the West to stop interfering in domestic 
issues and “… let [him] keep [his] Zimbabwe” (Hands off Zimbabwe, Mugabe tells Blair, 
2002), label Britain as “oppressors and colonials” (Warren, 2002) attempting to “re-colonise” 
Zimbabwe (Mugabe blames UK for crisis, 2003), and would accuse Western powers of 
sabotaging the country’s economy (West sabotaging Zim, 2003).  
 
Although mostly employed to counter Western criticism of his domestic policies, Mugabe also 
manipulated the language of anti-Western-Imperialism to brand any African critic as an agent 
of Western-Imperialism. Most notably, after Mbeki’s previously mentioned statement noting 
his concern over the legitimacy of elections in Zimbabwe, the Herald Newspaper, a mouthpiece 
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for the ZANU-PF at the time (Ingram, 2002), would accuse South Africa of “…conspiring with 
Britain to overthrow Mugabe” (Ingram, 2002: 134)  and of “…furthering the agenda of 
domestic and imperialist lobby” (Graham, 2006:121).  
 
Implicatures: 
 South Africa is not adhering to the principle of African solidarity (Invocation: 
Rule 1). 
 Because South Africa is not adhering to Rule 1, it is therefore an agent of 
Western-Imperialism (Construction, Rule 6: Any state that does not agree with 
Zimbabwean domestic policy is an agent of Western-Imperialism). 
 Zimbabwe is a sovereign state and no other state has the right to interfere in its 
domestic practices unless under exceptional circumstances (Invocation: Rule 2). 
 Zimbabwe’s contests the validity of the South African proposition that current 
domestic policy of land expropriation and political suppression constitutes the 
exceptional circumstances required to justify external intervention 
(Construction, Rule 7: Land expropriation and political suppression does not 
constitute the exceptional circumstances required to infringe on a state’s 
sovereignty). 
 
Speech Act 4: South Africa (verbal speech act): South Africa will publicly support Zimbabwe, 
but will continue to privately influence the Zimbabwean government. 
 
By the close of 2002 South Africa government had moved away from an impartial stance 
regarding the situation Zimbabwe towards an open endorsement of Mugabe and his practices 
(Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:390). In November 2002, the South African Foreign Minister, 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, endorsed Zimbabwe’s rationale of its land reform program as an 
act of defiance against Western-Imperialism. The following month, at the African National 
Congress’s 51st national congress, Dlamini-Zuma again expressed solidarity with Mugabe and 
in 2003 the South African government expressed outrage at the extension of Zimbabwe’s 
suspension from the Commonwealth (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:390-391).  
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The explicit public support for Mugabe however went hand-in-hand with continued Quiet 
Diplomacy as Mbeki had met personally with Mugabe on many occasions during his 
presidency and on more than one occasion did Mugabe promise Mbeki “good” behaviour only 
to renege on these promises afterwards (Graham, 2006:115-116). This policy of Quiet 
Diplomacy, with its balance between public support and private condemnation, continued 
throughout Mbeki’s tenure which ended in 2008. 
 
Implicatures: 
 South Africa accepts the validity of newly constructed rule number 6. 
 South Africa is not an agent of the West (Invocation: Rule 6). 
 South Africa accepts the validity of newly constructed rule number 7.  
 South Africa will continue with quiet diplomatic engagements (Invocation: 
Rule 4). 
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Figure 3.Visual Representation of South Africa / Zimbabwe Language Game (Author’s own 
design) 
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4.4) Hypothesis Testing 
An analysis of the various moves within the Zimbabwe / South Africa language game, taking 
into account the context within which this game was played, rationally justifies the South 
African action theorem which is the continued use of Quiet Diplomacy whilst publicly 
supporting Zimbabwe’s actions. In fact it would seem that such a policy was ultimately the 
only available to South Africa at the time. The main factor that limited South Africa’s possible 
moves was Mbeki’s strong endorsement of the African Renaissance and its principles, 
specifically those of African solidarity, respect of sovereignty and anti-Western-Imperialism, 
as will be explained forthwith. 
 
The promotion of an African renaissance had already limited South Africa’s response to 
Zimbabwe’s initial act of land expropriation and political opposition suppression. We can 
assume that Mbeki privately did not agree with Zimbabwe’s domestic policy at that stage, as 
confirmed by various sources previously cited, but at the same time he could not intervene 
publicly or directly due to the social rules of African solidarity and the utmost respect for the 
sovereignty and autonomy of another state. It was a “precarious balancing act”, as Lipton 
(2009:333) so succinctly states it, which arose from the tensions between certain principles of 
the African Renaissance and South Africa’s foreign policy at the time, “… particularly with 
regards to sovereignty and anti-imperialism, on the one side, and the defence of democracy and 
human rights on the other” (Lipton, 2009:333). At this point an obvious policy solution towards 
Zimbabwe did not present itself to South Africa and Mbeki due to the tensions between these 
social rules. If South Africa did intervene decisively it would have opened previous South 
African verbal commitments of solidarity and sovereignty to what game theorists refer to as 
“cheap talk”. Cheap talk is a term that some game theorists apply to any conversational 
commitments, arguing that these commitments can be reneged on without any penalty to the 
agent that made the commitment in the first place, but as Duffy et al. argue , cheap talk might 
not be so cheap after all, as “… bargainers who regularly renege on their verbal commitments 
soon find themselves without bargaining partners.” (Duffy et al., 1998:275). Therefore one has 
to consider that if Mbeki reneged on his previous commitments to solidarity and sovereignty, 
as enshrined within his doctrine of African Renaissance, he and his renaissance might well 
have completely lost legitimacy within the broader African political sphere. 
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While the seemingly contradictory social rules of African solidarity and respect for sovereignty 
on the one hand and the protection of democracy and human rights on the other hand had 
provoked the use of Quiet Diplomacy, it would seem that Zimbabwe’s branding of South Africa 
as an agent of Western-Imperialism (third speech act) ultimately entrenched this policy. 
Fighting Western-Imperialism was another important principle of Mbeki’s African 
Renaissance as South Africa had previously been suspected of being an agent of the West by 
the larger African political community. It would seem that Zimbabwe’s construction of social 
rule number six: Any state that does not agree with Zimbabwean domestic policy is an agent 
of Western-Imperialism, would severely limit any future game possibilities. At this point Mbeki 
had to choose between either public intervention on the grounds of the protection of democracy 
and human rights, which would entail a complete loss of legitimacy for his African renaissance 
project, or to publicly support Mugabe, thereby publicly adhering to at least three out of the 
four social rules that he himself helped construct and promote, and privately continuing with 
Quiet Diplomacy, thereby trying to promote the fourth. Logically, Mbeki’s only choice in the 
context of this game would be the continued use of Quiet Diplomacy whilst publicly condoning 
the actions of Zimbabwe.  
 
This testing of the initial hypothesis regarding the social rules that governed the speech acts 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe has proved coherent with South Africa’s final and actual 
action theorem, thereby validating these social rules. This case study therefore proves that anti-
Western-imperialist considerations is a fundamental, if not officially promoted, principle of 
South African foreign policy and that it was only after the introduction of anti-Western-
imperialist rhetoric by Mugabe that the decision to respect State Rights over Human Rights 
became cemented in the foreign policy regarding Zimbabwe. Although this was only one case 
study which could arguably be denounced as an isolated case, it does begin the lend credence 
to the theory of anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a variable able to influence South 
African foreign policy. Next we look at the case study regarding Sudan and the Darfur crisis 
for corroborating evidence. 
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Chapter 5: Case Study Two - The South African Response 
to International Allegations of Genocide in the Darfur 
Region of Sudan (2003 - ?) 
The second of the two case studies analysed in this thesis, the Sudanese humanitarian crisis is 
one that was born out of a long-standing animosity within the country culminating in what has 
been described as genocide in the Darfur region. A more thorough and insightful background 
exposition will be given in the first part of this section which will serve as the contextual 
background to a language game similar to the one constructed in the Zimbabwean case, albeit 
with three actors this time: South Africa, Zimbabwe and the US. The final dialogical analysis 
of the completed language game will once again demonstrate the prevailing influence of anti-
Western-imperialist considerations in the final outcome derived from the preceding speech 
acts.  
5.1) South Africa and the Use of Multi-Lateral Forums within the United 
Nations during the Darfur Crisis 
Straddling the divide between northern and southern Africa, accommodating both ethnic 
Africans and Arabs alike, it was inevitable that Sudan, like so many racially and culturally 
heterogeneous countries, would experience ethnic tensions throughout its history. In the region 
of Darfur such tensions could be traced back to the 1930s, intermittently resurfacing thereafter, 
and most recently in the 1980s (Dagne, 2004:5).  
 
The current crisis started in February of 2003 with the emergence of two ethnically African 
rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 
challenging the National Islamic Front (NIS) government in Khartoum. The rebels claimed that 
the government discriminated against Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur and 
systematically targeted these groups since the 1990s (Dagne, 2004:5). The Khartoum Public 
Defence Force (PDF), with the help of the local Arab militia known as the Janjaweed (devils 
on horseback), responded with a “brutal campaign of mass killing and ethnic cleansing” 
(Bellamy, 2006: 31) of ethnic Africans and those supportive of the rebels in the region. In 2013, 
the UN estimated that as many as 300,000 people have been killed, 1.4 million displaced within 
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the region and countless others have fled to neighbouring countries as a direct result of the 
crisis in Darfur (Darfur Conflict, 2013). 
 
The death tolls and ethnic specificity of the killings led Mukesh Kapila, UN coordinator in 
Sudan, to labelling the violence as genocide. The US senate would later that same year pass 
judgment on the role ethnicity played in the killings, declaring a state orchestrated genocide in 
the Darfur region. Although it would not refer to the crisis as genocide, the UN did, on the 11th 
of June 2004, officially recognise the crisis in Darfur by the passing of Resolution 1547, calling 
“… upon the parties to use their influence to bring an immediate halt to the fighting in the 
Darfur region ...” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1547, 2004:2). The fighting, 
however, failed to subside and between 2004 and 2005 the UN passed many more resolutions 
regarding the crisis in Darfur, each expressing harsher admonishments of the Sudanese 
government in Khartoum than the next, culminating in March 2005 with the passing of three 
resolutions. One, resolution 1590, authorised force to protect civilians. Another, resolution 
1591, passed a travel ban on war criminals, and lastly, resolution 1593 referred Sudan to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). Throughout the crisis Sudanese president Omar Hassan 
Ahmed al-Bashir had denied any genocide in his country and if there was then he denied any 
involvement, rather blaming the West for a protracting the crisis for their own interests.  In 
2009 al-Bashir became the first acting president of a sovereign state to be indicted by the ICC 
for international war crimes.  
 
South African involvement with Sudan had started even before the Darfur crisis had erupted 
into an international humanitarian concern. Pretoria had been intimately involved in the on-
going peace process in the violent south of the country, culminating in South Africa chairing 
the AU Ministerial Committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Sudan 
established in 2003, the first such committee of its kind. Under the auspices of this chair, South 
Africa, at the request of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), would embark on a 
very comprehensive program for the development, training and capacity building of the people 
of Southern Sudan aimed at expediting the process of government transition in the region. At 
the start of the crisis, in 2003, South Africa would spend much time elucidating the crisis in 
Darfur, as well as the need for a swift and sustainable resolution through official state 
communiqué. It was however during 2007, after South Africa’s admittance as a non-permanent 
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member of the UNSC, that the country would have the most international political clout to 
facilitate such as resolution. However, during this time international media and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would accuse SA of abusing its position in various UN 
forums to blindly defend Sudan and President al-Bashir. In 2008 the Human Rights Watch 
would write a public letter to the deputy minister of foreign affairs of South Africa expressing 
their dismay over South Africa’s actions in both the UNSC and the UN Human Rights Council 
(HRC)(Human Rights Watch, 2008).  Specific mention was made of SA voting, on the 28th 
November 2006 at the HRC, against a draft resolution that would call “… for all parties, 
including the Sudanese government, to bring to justice those responsible for killing, raping, 
and injuring civilians in the Darfur region of Western Sudan” (HRW, 2008) only to vote for a 
‘weaker’ resolution thereafter which would place no such responsibility on the Khartoum 
government. Further accusations of South Africa using UN forums to support the Sudanese 
government include the following: 
 
In 2007, having been elected to the UN Security Council, South Africa backed Sudan in 
rejecting a resolution that could lead to sanctions against combatants who attacked 
civilians, obstructed peace initiatives, or refused to cooperate with UNAMID, the United 
Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur. Pretoria also opposed a resolution 
condemning rape as a political and military instrument, tabled by the United States in the 
UN General Assembly in 2007, because it believed that the US was targeting the 
government of Sudan.  
(Nathan, 2011:56) 
 
South Africa stood accused of having a foreign policy that explicitly supported an 
internationally recognised despotic regime as evidenced through their stance in official UN 
forums. But why would the South African government, who had thus far used all manner of 
diplomatic measures to solve the crisis specifically in Darfur, and in Sudan in general, 
seemingly exacerbate the problem by actively blocking harsher measures against President al-
Bashir and the Sudanese government? This question can once again be rationally answered by 
analysing a detailed language game that played itself out during the period of 2003 to 2007 
under the presidency Thabo Mbeki. 
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5.2) Background Knowledge and Context 
In the interest of consistency, the context and rules of the following language game regarding 
the crisis in Darfur will be informed by the same principles of Mbeki’s African Renaissance, 
as was the case with Zimbabwe. 
 
5.2.1) Rules 
As with the Zimbabwe case the following set of five social rules, derived from Mbeki’s African 
Renaissance, are relevant to the following language game: 
Rule 1: African Solidarity is a desired state in continental affairs. 
Rule 2: State sovereignty is highly regarded and no external state should infringe on another’s 
autonomy unless under exceptional circumstances. 
Rule 3: Western-Imperialism should be countered where possible. 
Rule 4: Only non-violent and diplomatic means should be used in interstate disputes. 
Rule 5: Democracy and human rights should be promoted and protected where possible.  
 
5.3) Reconstructed Dialogue and Analysis 
The following represents a reconstructed language game structured as a dialogue through 
speech acts. It differs from the Zimbabwe case in that it follows the speech acts of three, rather 
than just two actors: South Africa, Sudan and the United States of America. But it is similar to 
the previous case in that the reconstruction is neither a verbatim exposition of any actual 
negotiation that occurred between the two parties nor is it supposed to reflect a single closed-
door negotiation session. Rather this particular language game is reconstructed using explicit 
speech acts (verbal and non-verbal), garnered from a variety of sources, that span the course of 
Mbeki’s nine year tenure as the president of South Africa. This reconstruction is also not 
completely perfect in a chronological sense, as such a dialogue would be lengthy, but rather it 
focuses on the main assertions made by each party and their relevant responses.  
 
The US is included in this specific dialogue as a representative of ‘the West’ and also as it has 
been one of the most verbal, both within the UN and in international media, opponents of the 
crisis in Darfur and specifically the regime of President al-Bashir.  The reconstructed dialogue 
starts with the US labelling the situation in Darfur as genocide and ends with South Africa 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 74 
 
using its position within UN forums to block certain resolutions against Sudan. In this case the 
final speech act by South Africa will once again be regarded as the action theorem for this 
dialogical analysis and as usual it has to be proven that this policy can logically be deduced 
from the dialogue that precedes it when one takes into consideration the context (social rules) 
within which this dialogue takes place.  
 
Speech Act 1: United States (verbal speech act) – The events in Darfur amount to genocide.  
Speech Act 2: South Africa (verbal speech act)  – The situation in Darfur, although serious, 
does not amount to genocide and should be solved through indirect diplomacy. 
Speech Act 3: United States (verbal speech act)  – Uses the UN as a platform to try and change 
Sudanese governments behaviour. 
Speech Act 4: Sudan (verbal speech act) – Accuses the US and the West of imperialism. 
Speech Act 5: South Africa (verbal speech act) - Uses its position in UN to block resolutions 
against Sudan.   
 
5.3.1) Pragmatic and Argument Analysis 
 
Speech Act 1: United States (verbal speech act): The events in Darfur amount to genocide. 
 
According to Article 2 of UN treaty 1021 entitled  the ‘Convention on the prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide adopted by the general assembly of the United Nations on 
9 December 1948’: 
 
”In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing 
members of the group; causing serious bodily harm  to members of the group; deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated  to bring about physical destruction in 
whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.”  
 (United Nations, 1951: 278) 
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In March of 2004 Mukesh Kapila, UN co-ordinator for Sudan, referred to the crisis in Darfur 
as “… ethnic cleansing … characterised by a scorched-earth policy [that] was comparable in 
character, if not scale, to the 1994 Rwandan genocide” (Mass rape atrocity in west Sudan, 
2004). At the 4988th meeting of the UNSC on the 11th of June 2004, the representative of the 
US reiterated a statement of the day before, by the leaders of the Group of Eight, in which they 
“expressed their grave concern over the humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in 
Darfur” (United Nations Security Council, 2004:2).  That same day the US voted in favour of 
UNSC Resolution 1547, the first resolution passed in the UN referring specifically to the Darfur 
crisis which “… [called] upon parties to use their influence to bring an immediate halt to the 
fighting in the Darfur region” (United Nations Security Council, 2004:2). Resolution 1547 also 
confirmed the UNSC’s commitment to respecting the sovereignty, independence and unity of 
Sudan.  
 
On the 22nd of July 2004 the United States Senate declared, through unanimous vote, that the 
‘… atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide” (United States Senate, 2004). Later 
that month at the 5015th meeting of the UNSC on the 30th of July 2004 the US representative 
laid the blame for the situation in Darfur squarely at the feet of the Sudanese government, 
accusing Khartoum of arming the Janjaweed militia and encouraging them to attack civilians 
(USNC, 2004:4). At the same meeting the US, amongst others, proposed a draft resolution 
which while once again reaffirming the UNSC’s “… commitment to the sovereignty, unity, 
territorial integrity, and independence of Sudan …” (United Nations Security Council, 2004:1) 
also introducing the possibility of sanctions should the government not have complied with 
certain measures to ease the crisis within 30 days. The US representative expressed that, with 
regards to Resolution 1556 “… many people who are concerned about Darfur would say that 
this resolution does not go far enough …” and that those same people would want the Security 
Council to label the situation in Darfur as genocide as the US Senate had previously done 
(USNC, 2004:4).  
 
In the first speech act of this reconstructed dialogue the US labels the situation in Darfur as 
genocide and places blame thereof on the Sudanese Government. It does not however suggest 
that the international norm of state sovereignty be broken to facilitate behavioural changes. 
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Implicatures: 
 Gross human rights violations are occurring on Sudanese soil and should be stopped 
immediately (Invocation: Rule 5). 
 The events that occurred, by the end of 2005, in the Darfur Region of Sudan are to be 
constituted as a genocide by the official Sudanese government (Construction, Rule 6: 
As of 2004 the Sudanese government is committing genocide in its own Darfur region). 
 The current genocide does not constitute an ‘exceptional’ circumstance needed to 
violate state sovereignty (Construction, Rule 7: Genocide does not constitute 
‘exceptional’ circumstances needed to violate state sovereignty). 
 UN members should use the threat of sanctions to try and persuade the Sudanese 
government to change is current policy in Darfur (Invocation: 4). 
 
Speech Act 2: South Africa (verbal speech act): The situation in Darfur, although serious, 
does not amount to genocide and should be solved through indirect diplomacy. 
 
Before the crisis in Darfur, Mbeki and South Africa had been integrally involved in the peace 
efforts pertaining to the war between north and south Sudan, an effort that the South African 
president and his government were never silent about. Presidential communiqués, official 
speeches, and other government documents during 2003 and early 2004 reveals the concern of 
Pretoria regarding the conflict in Sudan and the immediate resolution thereof. In February 2003 
Dr. Dlamini Zuma, minister of foreign affairs at the time, visited Khartoum were she was 
informed on the peace process and settlement of the conflict in Southern Sudan (DIRCO, 
2003). In March the same year Mbeki referred to the “problem” in Sudan and how it could not 
be resolved without an inclusive process (The Presidency, 2003). One of the explicitly stated 
foreign policy priorities for the South African government in 2003 was to “… continue on-
going efforts to achieve peace and stability …” in Sudan (van Niuewkerk, 2004:96). South 
Africa also took the lead as chairman to the newly established AU Ministerial Committee on 
Post-conflict Reconstruction in Sudan in 2003. 
 
Later in 2004 and 2005, when the situation in Darfur had become an undeniable crisis and 
humanitarian disaster, the South African government once more used public forums and 
official state documents to draw attention to the crisis in the region and the need for its 
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resolution. High profile official state visits were made: the two highest ranking South African 
government officials independently visited Sudan over the course of a month, with Deputy 
President Jacob Zuma meeting with Dr. John Garang, the chairperson of the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM), on the 3rd of December 2004 to discuss, amongst other issues, 
the ‘Darfur conflict (DIRCO, 2004), and Mbeki meeting with al-Bashir over new year’s 2004 
to discuss resolution of the “conflict situation in Darfur” (DIRCO, 2004). In official public 
statements, such as to the European parliament in November 2004, Mbeki expressed his 
conviction that under the leadership of the AU and “… whatever the current difficulties …” 
the conflict in Darfur will be resolved (DIRCO, 2004). Official state documents such as the 
Department of Foreign Affairs Annual Report 2004/05 acknowledged that “… the proportions 
of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur increased during 2004 and the beginning of 2005” (DFA, 
2005: 144). 
 
By 2005 South Africa had made it clear that there was indeed a serious conflict in Darfur that 
had amounted to a humanitarian crisis which was in need of immediate resolution. Pretoria 
would however not propose that Sudan’s state sovereignty be violated in order to facilitate 
immediate resolution, rather espousing an ‘inclusive process’ (The Presidency, 2003). 
Throughout this period of time the South African government would not officially make 
mention of the terms ‘genocide’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ with regards to Darfur, siding with the 
AU general assembly who in July 2004 noted that “… even though the humanitarian situation 
in Darfur is serious, it can not be defined as a genocide” (AU, 2004:28).  
 
As its first speech act, the South African government would make it clear that while it was 
cognisant of a humanitarian disaster in the Darfur region and would use any means of indirect 
diplomatic measures to seek a speedy resolution thereof, it would not concede that genocide is 
being perpetrated nor that any direct actions that could possibly violate the sovereignty of 
Sudan should be pursued. 
 
Implicatures: 
 Gross human rights violations are occurring on Sudanese soil and should be stopped 
immediately (Invocation: Rule 5). 
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 The situation in Darfur, by the end of 2005, does not constitute genocide by the 
Sudanese government (Contestation: Rule 6).. 
 The current situation in Darfur does not constitute as an ‘exceptional circumstance’ 
needed to violate the sovereignty of the Sudanese State (Invocation: Rule 2). 
 South Africa believes that the crisis in Darfur can only be solved through indirect 
diplomatic means (Invocation: Rule 4).   
 
Speech Act 3: United States (verbal speech act) – Uses the UN as a platform to try and change 
Sudanese government’s behaviour. 
 
From 2005 the United States started applying more pressure on the Sudanese government in 
UN forums. In March 2005 resolutions 1590 and 1591 were passed by the United Nations 
Security Council. Resolution 1591 proposed a travel ban on war criminals from Sudan and 
Resolution 1590, supported by the US, authorized the United Nations Mission to Sudan 
(UNMIS), acting under Chapter VII of the UN charter, to take “… the necessary action … to 
protect civilians under threat of physical violence” (UNSC, 2005:6). Chapter VII of the UN 
charter, pertaining to Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression, asserts that if the Security Council determines the existence of any such 
threats it may decide to institute diplomatic measures including the “… complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”, and call on UN members 
to enforce such pressures on violators (UNSC, 2014). In the event that such measures prove to 
be inadequate the Security Council may decide to “… take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UNSC, 
2014). Later that same month the US would table a draft resolution, later to be voted in as 
Resolution 1593, which would specifically target individuals responsible for the crisis in 
Darfur. The resolution stated that UN member states shall “prevent entry into or transit through 
their territories” of all persons, designated by a special UNSC Committee, who impede the 
peace process or constitute a threat to stability in Darfur as well as “… freezing all funds, 
financial assets and economic resources …”(UNSC, 2005:4) of said persons.  
In August 2006 the US, together with ten other states, would submit another draft resolution 
that would eventually be adopted as Resolution 1706. This resolution called for 17,300 UN 
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military personnel to be deployed in Darfur to strengthen United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS) and authorised the mission to “use all necessary means” to support the peace process, 
prevent the disruption thereof and prevent attack and threats against civilians (UNSC, 2006:6).  
In its second speech act, the US would utilise the full power of its resources and political clout 
to draft and support a range of resolutions that seek to apply even greater pressure on the 
Sudanese government to change its current behaviour including: economic and diplomatic 
sanctions against the state of Sudan; international travel restrictions and asset freezing of its 
highest officials; the deployment of a sizeable UN peacekeeping force authorised to ‘use all 
necessary means’ to maintain peace in the Darfur region. 
Implicatures: 
 Gross human rights violations are occurring on Sudanese soil and should be stopped 
immediately (Invocation: Rule 5). 
 The US can and will use its superior resources and political power to change the 
behaviour of the Sudanese government through UN sanctions, restricting state officials 
and the deployment of peacekeeping forces (Construction: Rule 8 – The US can and 
will use its multi-lateral forums such as the UN to try and change the behaviour of other 
states). 
 
Speech Act 4: Sudan (verbal speech act) – Accuses the US and the West of imperialism 
 
Not soon after the UN co-ordinator for Sudan referred to the events in Sudan as ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ did Sudan begin blaming the West of enflaming the Darfur situation. According to 
the Sudan Tribune, senior Sudanese officials had as early as June 2004, during a state visit to 
Cairo, accused the west of “stirring” and “exaggerating” the conflict in Darfur, explaining that 
the conflict was “fabricated” by the international community, particularly the West (Sudan 
Blames West for Darfur Conflict, 2004). Some believed that this fabrication was Western media 
falsely attempting to present the crisis as a race or religious war, whereas “… the people of 
Sudan are all Africans, be they Black-Africans or Arab-Africans” (Prah, 2004). Others such as 
Egypt’s Al-Ahram and Syria’s Al-Ba’ath newspapers specifically accused the US of 
deliberately stirring trouble in the region in pursuit of its own oil interests (Igiri & Lyman, 
2004:21-22). This is a notion reiterated by Khartoum who in August of 2006 rejected UNSC 
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Resolution 1706 which authorised an AU / UN hybrid peace-keeping force in Darfur, 
describing the resolution as “… part of a comprehensive conspiracy for confiscating the 
country’s sovereignty” (African Union ‘will Quit Darfur’, 2006) and portraying a potential UN 
force as “… a tool in a Western effort to get access to Sudan’s oil” (Schneider, 2006). 
  
During the 5153th meeting of the UNSC, in March 2005, a representative of Sudan accused 
the US of inflexibility in the negotiations on a draft resolution which they had proposed 
(UNSC, 2005). This resolution would be voted in at the same meeting as Resolution 1593 and 
pertained to the travel ban on war criminals. The Sudanese representative would further state 
that resolution 1593 was “… a resolution of the United States Congress – a Congress that does 
not know the history of peoples, does not read the history of other nations and does not know 
about the cultures of other people, because it does not read about those cultures” (UNSC, 2005).  
 
Khartoum would continue to place the blame on Western doorsteps throughout the crisis. In 
March 2007, President al-Bashir, in his first interview with Western journalists in three years, 
would once again accuse the US of trying to seize Darfur’s oil riches (Sudan’s al-Bashir Denies 
Role in Darfur Violence, 2007) and in November the same year he accused British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown of deliberately undermining the Darfur peace talks (Sudan Blames 
West for Crisis, 2007).  
 
In this penultimate speech act the Sudanese government accuses the US of enflaming the crisis 
in Darfur for the benefit of its own interests and using the UN as a forum to push its own brand 
of neo-imperialism. 
 
Implicatures: 
 The US should not use its superior resources and political power to change the 
behaviour of the Sudanese government through UN sanctions, state official restrictions 
and the deployment of peacekeeping forces (Contestation: Rule 8). 
 The current involvement of the US in the Darfur situation constitutes Western-
Imperialism (Construction: Rule 9 – The US, using its clout and resources to push an 
agenda through UN and its media outlets is considered a form of Western-Imperialism). 
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 The situation in Darfur would be resolved without Western-imperialist intervention 
(Invocation: Rule 3). 
 
Speech Act 5: South Africa (verbal speech act): South Africa uses its position in UN to block 
resolutions against Sudan.   
On the 28 of November 2006 a decision on Darfur was adopted by the HRC that called on all 
parties to sign a Peace Agreement, noted the seriousness of the humanitarian situation in Darfur 
and called upon the Sudanese Government to continue and intensify its cooperation with the 
Human Rights Council (UNHRC, 2006). This decision was initially proposed by Algeria on 
behalf of the Africa group and was supported by SA. On the previous day, SA would oppose 
amendments, proposed by Finland and Canada, to the decision that would have “... [emphasised] 
the primary obligation of the Government of Sudan to protect all individuals against violations, 
including sexual and other forms of gender-based violence and the use of child soldiers” and 
called on all parties to “… [assist] in bringing to justice those responsible for grave crimes 
under international law” (UNHRC, 2006). 
On 16 April 2007 South Africa’s representative to the U.N., Dumisani Kumalo, stated that 
South Africa had embraced a pragmatic foreign policy, one that urges countries like Sudan to 
resolve their disputes through negotiations and that the government in seeking to counter “… 
an imbalance of global power …" in the U.N. Security Council, where the “… United 
States, Britain, France, Russia and China use their authority to attack enemies and to shield 
friends” (Lynch, 2007).    
A day thereafter (17 April 2007), President Mbeki, in a TV interview regarding a recent trip to 
Karthoum to meet with President al-Bashir on the issue of Darfur, expressed the need for “the 
Sudanese government to act against people who might have committed crimes against 
humanity” and that this need was shared with al-Bashir. Mbeki also related both men’s concern 
over disagreements between the UN, AU and Sudanese government regarding the deployment 
of helicopter gunships and who would be in control of them as “… they are not your normal 
peacekeeping military equipment, they're combat equipment” (DIRCO, 2007). The lack of 
clarity regarding the issue of whether the hybrid force would have two commanders, one from 
the AU and one from the UN, was also noted by Mbeki as being of concern as “… you can't 
have one military force with two commanders” (DIRCO, 2007).  
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In the 5717th meeting of the UNSC, on the 16th July 2007, South African Ambassador Dumisini 
Kumalo reported on a UNSC visit to Khartoum in which the Sudanese foreign minister as well 
as President al-Bashir confirmed their acceptance of a hybrid UN-AU operation should it be 
proposed, a statement confirmed by the representative of the UK speaking on behalf of 
Ambassador Jones Parry who accompanied Mr. Kumalo on the trip (UNSC, 2007:2-4). The 
next day however a draft proposal for an AU / UN hybrid force, which included the possibility 
of sanctions against Sudanese officials, was rejected by South Africa with Ambassador Kumalo 
warning that any talk of sanctions in the draft was "totally unacceptable"” (Opposition to 
Darfur Resolution, 2007). Finally on the 31st of July, South Africa would lend it support and 
help to vote in Resolution 1769 which authorised the deployment of an AU / UN hybrid force 
in Darfur. This resolution would make no mention of sanctions (UNSC, 2007).  
 
In November 2007 South Africa was accused of leading a frontal attack on a US submitted 
draft resolution entitled Elimination Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence in all their 
Forms and Manifestations, including in Conflict and Related Situations because it believed 
that the US was targeting the government of Sudan (Nathan, 2011:56). Deputy Minister Aziz 
Pahad would later rebuke these allegations claiming that South Africa had rather taken issue 
with the perceived “categorisation of rape” in the draft resolution that would differentiate 
between rape by “… military and militia groups and rape by civilians” (DIRCO, 2007). 
Minister Pahad called for a broad and de-politicised resolution of rape and proposed that the 
issue had been advanced more effectively with South Africa’s call for a better approach, rather 
than “… having no input and just accepting what is proposed by other countries …”, adding 
that “… South Africa will never accept a position that if its big countries that propose 
resolutions we must accept them as given” (DIRCO, 2007). 
By this time, still no mention of genocide has been made with regards to the situation in Darfur, 
neither from the South African government or the AU. 
By the end of 2007 South Africa would make it clear that while it was still actively pursuing a 
quick and sustainable resolution to the crisis in Darfur, it would not tolerate any interference 
in the peace process by Western powers acting in self-interest.  
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Implicatures: 
 Gross human rights violations are occurring on Sudanese soil and should be stopped 
immediately (Invocation: Rule 5). 
 The West, specifically the US, should not capitalise on its favourable position in the 
imbalance of global power to change the behaviour of the Sudanese government by 
calling for sanctions against Sudanese officials and by politicising the nature of rape in 
the UN (Contestation: Rule 8). 
 The US in using its superior resources and political power to push neo-imperialism 
through the UN (Acceptance: Rule 9 – The US, using its clout and resources to push 
an agenda through the UNSC and its media outlets is considered a form of Western-
Imperialism). 
 Western-Imperialism should be countered where possible in multi-lateral forums such 
as the UN (Invocation: Rule 3). 
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Figure 4. Visual Representation of South Africa / United States / Sudan Language Game 
(Author’s own design) 
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5.4) Hypothesis Testing 
As with the case of Zimbabwe, Mbeki’s promotion of an African Renaissance, specifically the 
principles of African solidarity, respect for sovereignty and anti-Western-Imperialism, would 
severely limited the moves of the South African government at the time. 
The African Renaissance and the fear of ‘cheap talk’ would once again limited SA’s response 
to the initial crisis to indirect diplomatic rather than direct military or economic response. 
Mbeki could not break his unwavering commitment to the respect of sovereignty and African 
solidarity, two integral ideals prescribed within his African Renaissance, for fear of de-
legitimising the whole paradigm. Therefore SA would continue its efforts of negotiating a 
settlement to the North-South civil war and try to use the amassed political clout thereof to 
seek a speedy resolution to the Darfur crisis as well. This would unfortunately not happen.   
The principle of anti-Western-Imperialism would once again play an important role in the 
proceeding of language game, limiting South Africa’s responses along the way. Khartoum 
painting the US as a neo-imperialist using its superior resources and political clout to further 
its own interests in the region coupled with the Mbeki’s convictions regarding African 
solidarity and anti-Western-Imperialism would mean that the South African President’s 
responses were limited to being ‘supportive’ of the Khartoum. This does not mean that he 
would have to condone the situation in Darfur, nor that he would not privately try to sway the 
hand of president al-Bashir, but that in multi-lateral forum such as the UN he would have to 
counter perceived acts of Western-Imperialism where possible for the sake of legitimising his 
African Renaissance.     
Once again, as with the case of Zimbabwe, testing of the initial hypothesis regarding the social 
rules that governed the speech acts between South Africa and Sudan has proved coherent with 
South Africa’s final and actual action theorem thereby validating these social rules. This case 
study, in addition to the first, shows that anti-Western-Imperialism played a major role in 
limiting the moves available to Thabo Mbeki and the SA government regarding a response to 
the crisis in both Darfur and Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 6: Western-Imperialism – an Existential Threat 
Buried in the Psycho-Cultural Disposition of Mbeki 
In both the case studies conducted for this thesis it is apparent that Mbeki’s persistent beliefs 
a) in combating Western-Imperialism where encountered, b) the necessity for African 
solidarity, and c) the unimpugnable sanctity of state sovereignty, all principles promulgated in 
his African Renaissance, had seriously limited the availability of rational ‘moves’ that Mbeki 
would be able to make in response to those of the governments of Mugabe and al-Bashir. Mbeki 
would not be able to openly oppose the practices of the Sudanese or Zimbabwean governments 
of the time for fear of contradicting the principles of his own African Renaissance and therefore 
risk de-legitimising the whole initiative in the eyes of the rest of the African continent. This 
explains the tentative ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ approach initiated in response to both cases whereby 
conspicuous support for the regimes was coupled with constant, but subdued, diplomatic 
attempts to privately resolve the issues in each country. Although the statement ‘the availability 
of Mbeki’s moves were limited’ can easily be misconstrued as advocacy of external limitations 
that forced the hand of the South African president, it is the opposite that is in reality being 
advocated here. In this case the ‘limitation of moves’ is meant to indicate that it is Mbeki’s 
own beliefs and world views that limited the number of political options available to him in 
dealing with the countries mentioned while still be rationally congruent. To elucidate this 
hypothesis RBLOC was used to show that all the actions of the president were rational in that 
they followed rationally from the choices that he had limited himself to.  These limitations 
themselves are evident in the Mbeki’s African Renaissance which can be said to reflect both 
the psychological and cultural influences of the man himself or rather his psycho-cultural 
disposition if you will. 
Psycho-cultural disposition is the wording used by Balzacq when speaking of the pragmatic 
practice of a securitising speech act that does not happen in isolation, but in a configuration of 
circumstances, including, but not limited to, the “psycho-cultural disposition of the audience” 
(Balzacq, 2005:72). The audience in this case being the ones that complete the securitisation 
process by accepting the validity of the securitising move of the securitising actor. With the 
use of security theory one can logically deduce not only certain facets of the psycho-cultural 
disposition of the audience (in this case Mbeki acting as SA president) at the time, but also 
ascertain the nature of the relevant referent objects (objects that possess a legitimate claim to 
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survival as mutually agreed by actor and audience) and what threats constitute an existential 
threat to such referent objects. How this is achieved is explained in the following section, but 
achieving it serves the dual purpose of not only strengthening the argument for anti-Western-
imperialist considerations as a dominating factor within South Africa / Africa diplomatic 
relations, but also fulfilling one of the main tasks for a Securitisation Theory analyst which is 
“… constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded 
to as a threat” (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998:26).  
6.1) Deriving the Psycho-Cultural Disposition, Referent Objects and 
Existential Threats from Securitisation Theory 
One would not be able to surmise the complete psycho-cultural disposition of Mbeki at any 
given time, at least it would be impossible to deliver a complete and perfectly accurate 
depiction within the scope of this study, but one could reasonably assume certain facets of his 
disposition at that time. Within the framework of Securitisation Theory it stands to reason that 
if the ‘audience’ accepts the validity claim of the securitising actor as to the legitimacy of an 
existential threat to a referent object, then the nature of both the threat and the object can be 
indicative of a certain aspect of the audience’s psycho-cultural disposition. For an explanative 
example, we return to the scenario of the family that accepts and allows the father to resort to 
‘dirty tricks’ in securing his job and therefore his family’s current lifestyle. Previously the 
family’s lifestyle was identified as being a referent object and job loss was the threat that 
threatened the existence of the family lifestyle (referent object) and therefore needed to be 
negated by any means necessary.  
Knowing the nature of the existential threat and the referent object in the family scenario, one 
can draw certain conclusions regarding the psycho-cultural disposition of the family 
(audience). For instance, at the most superficial and obvious level we can say that the current 
family lifestyle is very important to the family, at least important enough to warrant the dad 
engaging in ‘dirty tricks’, which would not normally be advocated, in order to ensure the 
continued existence of this lifestyle. However, from this particular case we cannot tell whether 
the family lifestyle is more important than other threats, say for instance murder. It is uncertain 
whether the family would allow the dad to commit murder to ensure the family lifestyle, but 
what can be deduced for sure is that the family lifestyle is important enough to allow dirty 
tricks in order to combat the threat of job loss. This statement then becomes indicative of a 
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certain psycho-cultural disposition that allows for this to be true, such as that maintaining the 
current quality of lifestyle is considered important to the family. Perhaps there is shame in 
being poorer than the family currently is or that money for the education of the children is 
highly valued, and the dirty tricks required to negate the threat of job loss is not considered a 
big moral or societal sacrifice, at least not when weighed against the importance of retaining 
the current family lifestyle. These are all important insights into the psycho-cultural disposition 
of the family as deduced from the fact that they successfully accepted the validity claim of the 
father. This does not pretend to be a complete picture of the family’s disposition but it does 
highlight a few interesting facets. For a visual representation of the influence of the psycho-
cultural disposition within the securitisation framework consult Figure 5.   
The same principles of deducing a part of the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience from 
the accepted referent object and existential threat within the example of the family faced with 
job loss can be extrapolated to the examples of South Africa as the audience within the 
securitisation framework of the case studies of Zimbabwe and Sudan. But before we can deduce 
the psycho-cultural disposition, we have to first formulate the securitisation framework within 
which the variables of these case studies are placed and to identify the referent object and 
existential threat.    
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Figure 5. Visual Representation of the Influence of the Audience’s Psycho-Cultural Disposition 
within a Securitisation Framework (Authors own design) 
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6.2) Formulating a South Africa / Africa Securitisation Framework 
For the purposes of the creation of a regional securitisation framework it is required that South 
Africa be cast in the role of the ‘audience’ within this framework. As the driver of the crucial 
second part of securitisation, necessary for successful securitisation, it is the role of the 
audience to either accept or reject the securitisation move presented by the securitising actor. 
Where the securitising actor uses a securitising move to make a validity claim that an existential 
threat to a referent object exists that necessitates measures outside the normal socially (or in 
this case internationally) accepted measures, it is implied that if the audience accepts this 
securitising move as valid and allows the securitising actor to pursue these measures, thereby 
successfully completing securitisation, then the ‘audience’ accepts both the claims that the 
referent object is indeed something that needs to be protected at all costs and that the existential 
threat is indeed a threat. In other words, if we can pinpoint when South Africa began to support 
or perhaps allow another African country (the securitising actor) to pursue policies outside its 
own agreed upon international norms, and we can identify the securitising move that initiated 
this shift, we will be able to identify not only what South Africa would consider a referent 
object, but also what speech acts were considered necessary by other African countries in order 
to create the existential threat needed for successful securitisation. 
6.3) Western-Imperialism as an Existential Threat  
Both of the case studies are indicative of a successfully securitised move as in both cases South 
Africa either implicitly allowed, or explicitly supported, certain actions by the governments of 
other African states that were contradictory to its own political and / or social norms. In 
Zimbabwe, Mbeki publicly supported Mugabe thereby implicitly supporting land distribution 
without compensation as well as undemocratic government policies which destabilised not 
only Zimbabwe but also a large part the rest of the Southern African region. In Sudan, Mbeki 
supported Sudanese president al-Bashir both in public as well as in within the United Nations 
forum, thereby implicitly supporting violations of human rights and undemocratic behaviour. 
All of the practices that Mbeki implicitly supported, through explicit support for the 
governments that perpetrated them, are in stark contradiction to the values and principles 
promoted throughout post-apartheid South Africa’s official government documents, speeches, 
policies and even Mbeki’s own African Renaissance. This suggests that Sudan and Zimbabwe, 
acting as securitising actors, must have made a securitising move, the validity of which was 
accepted by South Africa, allowing the securitising actors to act outside the boundaries of  the 
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normally allowed scope of political actions to perpetrate these offences. Having identified the 
existence of successful securitisation, deductions can be made in order to ascertain the variables 
that concluded into such a move starting with when the securitising move was accepted by 
South Africa. Firstly a list of the variables that are already identified. 
 In both the cases researched South Africa was cast in the role of the audience and the 
governments of the relevant countries, Zimbabwe and Sudan, as the securitising actors.  
 It is clear that a securitising move by either of these countries has been accepted as 
South Africa allowed both of them to engage in practices considered beyond the norm 
of South African domestic and foreign policies.  
This successful securitisation implies that there exists a common referent object that South 
Africa and the other countries consider to possess a legitimate claim to survival and in both 
case studies the other African countries have convinced SA that the referent object was 
existentially threatened. In order to ascertain the nature of the referent object or the existential 
threat, the identification of the securitising move and related speech act that initiated such a 
move is required. 
In the Zimbabwean case study it was only after the Mugabe had labelled South Africa a ‘puppet 
of the West’ a ‘traitor to the struggle’ and accused Mbeki of ‘furthering the agenda of the 
domestic and imperialist lobby’, that South Africa began to publicly support Mugabe and the 
Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe and therefore implicitly their practices of unilateral land reforms and 
the suppression of political opposition. Here South Africa allowed and in some cases supported 
Zimbabwe in engaging in practices that fell outside what SA itself had explicitly constructed 
as political norms, suggesting a successful securitising move on the part of Mugabe. Similarly 
in the case of the Darfur crisis, Mbeki and South Africa began to lend significant support to 
Sudan, under al-Bashir, through its earnest opposition to various UN resolutions after the 
president al-Bashir began to blame the West for the troubles in Darfur.  In both of these 
situations we can ascertain that the acceptance of the securitising move happened after the 
securitising actor stated that a referent object was under threat of Western-Imperialism. 
Therefore we can imply that Western-Imperialism was the existential threat successfully used 
by the securitising actors in both these situations to convince South Africa of the need to 
securitise.  And as the legitimacy of an existential threat is informed by the psycho-cultural 
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disposition of the audience, in this case Mbeki, we can further infer that anti-Western-
Imperialism is a part of Mbeki’s psycho-cultural disposition, necessary to allow for the 
acceptance of Western-Imperialism as existential threat.  
Thus we can deduce two important statements from our analysis:  
1) anti-Western-Imperialist considerations did indeed influence the Mbeki administration’s 
foreign policy actions regarding human rights violations on the African continent in the events 
that African countries evoked imperialist rhetoric, and;  
2) the reason therefore is that, in accordance with the Securitisation Theory, the psycho-cultural 
disposition of Mbeki, as evident in his African Renaissance, dictated that Western-Imperialism 
be seen as an legitimate existential threat that when invoked through the imperialist rhetoric of 
an African securitising actor would ensure that SA, as the ‘audience’, would accept the validity 
claim of the securitising actor that extraordinary measures be employed to combat these threats. 
For the purposes of this study it is not important to know the exact nature of the referent object, 
but reasonable deductions from the same sources that were used to deduce the existential threat 
points towards either African solidarity or state sovereignty, most likely a mixture of both. 
6.4) Theoretical Limitations & the Possibility of Extrapolation to 
Contemporary SA Foreign Policy 
It is by no means the purpose of this work to imply that Western-Imperialism is the only 
existential threat that would be accepted as valid threat by South Africa, thereby allowing for 
successful securitisation of an issue nor that any other state would be able to replace Zimbabwe 
and Sudan as securitising actor and achieve the same successful securitisation using the same 
rhetoric of Western-Imperialism (securitising move). For now the case studies are limited to 
African countries and it would be wise not to underestimate the influence of African solidarity 
on the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience (Mbeki) at the time. Furthermore the 
presidentialist nature of Mbeki’s insistence on absolute dominance over South African foreign 
policy at the time of his presidency also limits the findings of this research to SA under Mbeki’s 
rule and does not necessarily presuppose to extend this to all SA foreign policy thereafter, 
however such a possibility should also not be ruled out. Although the self-imposed limitations 
on the scope of this study attribute the analyses and observations made within to the foreign 
policy of President Mbeki, it is not to say that the influence of anti-Western-Imperialist 
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considerations cannot be transferred to contemporary SA foreign policy under Jacob Zuma. 
Although outside the scope and without going into much detail, a very brief and superficial 
look at the 2011 Arab Spring and SA’s response to the establishment of a No-Fly Zone over 
Libya at the time hints strongly at such a possibility.  
In February 2011 anti-government protests began in earnest in Libya and were harshly met 
with government violence that would soon see the death toll rising to the thousands. By the 
following month, international condemnation for the substantial death toll would culminate in 
the passing of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 which authorised the 
protection of civilians by member states, established a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace, and 
requested the enforcement of an arms embargo and the freezing of the assets of certain Libyan 
authorities (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Resolution 1973 was supported by South 
Africa who as a member of the UNSC voted in favour of the resolution. However, Mr. Sangqu, 
the South African representative to the Council at the time, explicitly stated at the 6498th 
meeting, where the Resolution was adopted, that all stakeholders should “… search for a 
political solution” that “… preserve[s] the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya” 
and that “… [a]s a matter of principle, [SA] has supported the resolution, with the necessary 
caveats to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya and reject any foreign 
occupation or unilateral military intervention under the pretext of protecting civilians” (United 
Nations Security Council, 2011:9-10). On 19 March 2011, only a month after the passing of 
Resolution 1973, and French forces started a military intervention in Libya, soon supplemented 
by other Western powers and eventually the whole military operation was left to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military alliance comprised entirely of Western states. 
Another month thereafter, on the 14th of April at the 3rd Brazil Russia India China and South 
Africa (BRICS) summit in China, the BRICS nations declared that “… [w]e share the principle 
that the use of force should be avoided. We maintain that the independence, sovereignty, unity 
and territorial integrity of each nation should be respected (BRICS Third Summit Sanya 
Declaration, 2011). 
Supporting Resolution 1973 in February, followed by the contradictory denunciation of the use 
of force at the BRICS summit in April, was once again perceived by media and foreign policy 
pundits as indicative of inherent inconsistencies in SA foreign policy. Critics bemoaned the 
supposed contrarianism as cowardly recoiling from previous support (Fairbanks, 2011), 
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backtracking on decisions (Nibishaka, 2011), an about-turn on Libya (Moore, 2011), and 
Janus-faced (Petré, 2011). However if one were to take the principle influence of anti-Western-
imperialist considerations identified within this study and applied it to the situation, whereby 
the use of force by Western powers were to be construed by SA as Western-Imperialism 
(similar to the situation in Sudan a few years earlier), then it is completely reasonable, within 
the foreign policy framework created here, that SA would react in opposition to the use of force 
and is therefore in no way unexpected or contrarian. This is just a small example of how the 
principles identified in this thesis can perhaps also be applied to the presidency of the current 
SA president and possibly the one thereafter.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis was to use the constructivist theories of Securitisation and Rule 
Base, Language Orientated Constructivism to answer the following questions: a) what 
influence did anti-Western-imperialist considerations have in dictating the result of the conflict 
between the principles of State Rights (the respect for state sovereignty and African Solidarity 
and Human Rights (promoting human rights and democracy) in the response of Mbeki’s South 
African government to the humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe and Sudan and b) how can such a 
possible influence be rationally explained? 
The first of the research questions posed, related to the use anti-Western-imperialist 
considerations, which was defined in the context of this thesis as denoting an hypothesised 
situation whereby the anti-Western-imperialist convictions of Mbeki, as evidenced in his 
statements regarding the African Renaissance, is triggered by the appearance of Western-
imperialist rhetoric or perceived Western-Imperialism in specific situations. Anti-Western-
imperialist considerations thus becomes a variable that, it is further hypothesised, when present 
in a given situation is able to influence whether State Rights take precedent over Human Rights, 
a state which has normally been assumed as a given. The process of identifying anti-Western-
imperialist considerations as an influential variable was undertaken with the use of Rule Based, 
Language Orientated Constructivism (RBLOC) – a theoretical model that uses background 
information to contextualise a semi-chronological sequence of speech acts, constructed from 
available and reliable primary and secondary sources, that represents a dialogue between two 
or more actors. The dialogue is referred to as a language game. A game which adheres to and 
is dictated by certain rules that are deduced and inferred from background information and 
various sources at the conception of the game. Throughout the course of the dialogue the 
validity of these rules are either accepted or denied by the actors or new rules can be created, 
as inferred from the actors’ speech acts. The rules limit the possible future acts of the actors 
and therefore also the final action or position of the actors, referred to as the action theorem 
within RBLOC, and if the action theorem corresponds to the actual state of events and can be 
logically deduced from the preceding rules through dialogical analysis, then the theory is 
considered proven.  Within the scope of this thesis the RBLOC methodology was applied to 
the South African response to two humanitarian crises on the African continent within the 
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timeframe of Mbeki’s presidency: the near collapse of the economy and democracy in 
Zimbabwe and the alleged genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan.  
The first of the two language games involved a reconstructed dialogue between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa that started at the inception of the Zimbabwe crisis in 2000 with the ruling ZANU-
PF government seizing white-owned farms and imposing security legislation targeting 
opposition parties and their supporters, and played out as follows. Firstly, the South African 
government and Thabo Mbeki at the time responded to the occurrences in Zimbabwe by 
advising Mugabe (Zimbabwean president at the time) that the current actions will lead to a 
humanitarian disaster, and there is evidence of Mbeki privately conferring with Mugabe with 
the purpose of changing his current course of actions. Soon thereafter Mugabe responded by 
labelling South Africa an ‘agent of the West’ for assuming to interfere in the politics of the 
Zimbabwe. After being labelled an agent of the West, South Africa immediately and decidedly 
began issuing public statements of support for Zimbabwean policies – the eventual action 
theorem or final policy position of the language game. Throughout the three years that this 
game would be played out the situation within Zimbabwe, both economically and politically, 
became more dire and Mbeki’s eventual response of publicly supporting Mugabe was in direct 
contrast to the principles of the promotion of human rights and democracy and left most 
observers confused to the outcome, especially as South Africa possessed the means militarily, 
politically and economically to impose constructive changes within Zimbabwe. However, the 
inclusion of anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a rule to the language game allows for 
a logical and reasonable explanation for the public support of Zimbabwean policies after 
Mugabe’s accusations of Western influence over South Africa, as the exposure of Western-
imperialist rhetoric to the situation triggered Mbeki’s own anti-Western-imperialist convictions 
and thus introduced the variable of anti-Western-imperialist considerations. The introduction 
of this variable, as hypothesised, was able to influence South Africa’s international responses 
in the favour of State Rights over Human Rights, as proven by the rational outcome of the 
language game.  
The second language game reconstructed a dialogue within the context of the alleged genocide 
in the Darfur region of Sudan, this time involving three actors: the South African government, 
the Sudanese government (under Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir), and the government of 
United States of America.. This particular language game starts in 2004 with the United States 
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stating that the events occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan is tantamount to genocide 
perpetrated by the government of al-Bashir. In response, South Africa, who had previously 
been actively involved in mediating a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the crises in Darfur, 
retorted that while the situation was indeed serious, it did not constitute Genocide. Thereafter 
the United States used its clout within the United Nations to pass resolutions that would apply 
economic pressure on the Sudanese government and pave the way for possible military action 
within the region in an effort to avert further disaster. Sudan and al-Bashir subsequently 
accused America and the West of enflaming the situation in the Darfur region and using the 
situation as a convenient excuse to act on its true motivation - accessing Sudanese oil. 
Concluding the language game, South Africa in 2007 would finally adopt a position of actively 
seeking a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation in whilst at the same time using its 
own clout within the United Nations Human Rights Council and United Nations Security 
Council to pass resolutions sympathetic to the Sudanese government and block those, drafted 
by Western countries, that it perceived as unfairly targeting al-Bashir. Again the South African 
government would settle on a policy towards the Sudanese crisis that valued State Rights over 
Human Rights. And again if the variable of anti-Western-imperialist considerations is 
introduced into the situation, through Western-imperialist rhetoric by the Sudanese government 
as well as the South African perception of Western-Imperialism in the actions of Western 
countries through the United Nations, the final action theorem of South Africa becomes 
rationally explainable. SA’s possible moves were limited to supporting the government by the 
inclusion of anti-Western-imperialist considerations. 
Both the language games that were constructed from the Zimbabwean and Sudanese case 
studies indicated that anti-Western-imperialist considerations was indeed a viable variable 
shared in both situations. This thesis limits the research to two case studies, both during the 
presidency of Thabo Mbeki, and therefore is by no means indicative of an undeniable truth 
within contemporary South African foreign policy. Although a very superficial application of 
RBLOC theory to a similar case of ambiguous SA response to a humanitarian crisis in Libya 
during the Arab Spring in 2011 shows that anti-Western-imperialist considerations could 
possibly still be influential post the Mbeki administration. If this variable is indeed as 
influential as presented in this thesis, the question of why it is able to influence South African 
responses to continental crises still remained. A logical answer to this question would be 
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derived from the application of Securitisation theory, specifically the Copenhagen School of 
Securitisation Theory (CSST). 
The theoretical framework of the CSST emphasises the power of a securitising an issue, by 
explicitly or implicitly invoking the concept of security, a speech act conducted by a 
securitising actor, in convincing a target audience that extraordinary measures are allowed by 
the securitising actor in dealing with the securitised issue. Securitisation Theory has its roots 
in language theory, shared with RBLOC theory, which lends itself to complementing RBLOC 
theory in rationally explaining why the anti-Western-imperialist considerations, as identified 
through RBLOC theory, is able to influence South African responses to humanitarian crises in 
Africa. After extrapolating CSST to the inter-state level and highlighting the naturally 
deductive links of the various concepts pertinent in the theory, it was applied to the data 
obtained from the case studies. Application of the theory resulted in explaining that the psycho-
cultural disposition of Mbeki (his anti-Western-imperialist convictions) lends itself to Mbeki, 
as the target audience, accepting the validity claim of the securitising actor (in this case Mugabe 
or al-Bashir) that Western-Imperialism poses an existential threat to the African solidarity and 
state sovereignty (the mutually accepted referent object). By accepting the validity of the 
securitising move, South Africa, according to CSST, has allowed the securitising actor to 
engage in extra-ordinary measures to counter the existential threat of Western-Imperialism and 
will themselves engage in extraordinary measures to allow the securitising actor to accomplish 
this goal. Thus CSST helps us to reach the rational conclusion that the reason why anti-
Western-imperialist considerations are so influential is because the invocation of anti-Western-
Imperialism in situations of humanitarian crises in Africa securitises the that particular crisis 
by claiming Western-Imperialism as an existential threat to state sovereignty and African 
solidarity, a claim which is accepted naturally by SA as the target audience due to its own 
psycho-cultural disposition towards the mutually accepted nature of the referent objects, and 
the extraordinary political methods that caused the crises are therefore allowed and even 
enabled by SA.  
Ultimately the purpose of this work was to show that given the data and facts presented, it is 
the most logical conclusion that anti-Western-imperialist considerations did in these cases play 
a very important role in the muted response of Mbeki to violations of human rights within the 
African continent. Also to show how RBLOC theory and CSST theory complement it each 
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other in identifying and modelling the variables and logical steps required to confidently 
conclude the influence of anti-Western-Imperialism. And finally, to shed light on the 
possibilities of extrapolating Securitisation Theory to the regional level and contribute to the 
mutually referred existential threats on the African continent, and in doing so contribute to the 
knowledge base of the theory.       
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